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The utilization of cultural practices have in fact helped the community to 
build and maintain good social relations, especially in post-disaster context, 
that the community is able to conduct peace keeping, which is useful to 
hasten recovery processes. Further, those cultural practices are also very 
healthy for the development of local democracy, which is important in 
community’s disaster governance. Based on the experiences of the two 
communities in the above-mentioned areas in post-disaster contexts, this 
report highlights that democracy which is practiced from below every day, 
is an important seed for the development of democracy in general context. 
It could be an alternate route for the official democratization, which is 
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9EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ABOUT THE REPORT
This is a final report of a research project titled ‘Democracy From 
Below: cross-cultural community’s initiatives of post-disaster recovery 
in Indonesia’. This report tries to answer the existing pessimism of de-
mocratization in developing countries especially post-the fall down of 
authoritarian regimes, which turn to create the corrupt governments. 
This report criticizes current approach that stresses on the promotion 
of official democracy, but lacks attention to grassroots democracy. 
Meanwhile, it is clear that grassroots community has potential to be 
the agent of democratization. Direct observation in two disaster-prone 
areas in Indonesia reveals that in spite of the hardship of social rela-
tionship, there is still space for the community from different social 
backgrounds to develop democratic culture. The two communities’ 
experiences show us that democracy could live in a very simple way. 
It is not just of those that are established in public offices. It could 
live within the grassroots community’s daily life. It could present ev-
erywhere, in everyday life and in any form. Even, democracy in dai-
ly life could be an answer for the stagnancy of democracy in office. 
This report asserts that community in grassroots level is not a pas-
sive actor of democracy that always depends on the political system 
in supra-structure. Through their cultural and social practices, they 




The report is based on a field research conducted in two disas-
ter-prone areas in Indonesia, namely Sleman, Yogyakarta Province 
and Padang, West Sumatra Province. In Sleman the fieldwork was 
focused on Kaliurang, while in Padang it was focused on Chinatown 
(locally called Pondok). Kaliurang, Sleman, is identical with Javanese 
culture, while Padang, West Sumatra is identical with Minangkabau 
culture. The field research tried to elaborate community’s experience 
in dealing with the issues of diversity and differences during the pe-
riods of post-disaster recovery. In Sleman, research was focused on 
Kaliurang and its surrounding villages near Merapi Volcano that be-
comes one of the prominent tourism destinations in the Province. In 
Padang, research was focused around Pondok (Chinatown) that be-
comes the center of economy in the area. 
These two areas were chosen because they have different char-
acteristics of society. Kaliurang and its surroundings are rural, while 
Pondok is urban. Kaliurang depends on farming and volcano tourism, 
while Padang depends on trading. As Javanese, people in Kaliurang 
are generally known to be syncretic in their religious belief, while Mi-
nangkabau is known to be a strict Moslem. Yet, communities in both 
areas have similarities in terms of ability to deal with the issues of di-
versity and differences arose in the midst of recovery processes. They 
use their daily cultures in that matter. Kaliurang community uses got-
ong royong, serawung, and sengkuyung, that assert the idea of collec-
tiveness, mutual helps and mutual understanding, while Padang uses 
cultural values such as raso pareso, that contains the idea of tolerance, 
to build engagement amongst community members from different 
ethnic/religious groups during the recovery periods post 2010 volcano 
eruption in Yogyakarta and 2009 earthquake in West Sumatra. 
The utilization of cultural practices have in fact helped the com-
munity to build and maintain good social relations, especially in 
post-disaster context, that the community is able to conduct peace 
keeping, which is useful to hasten recovery processes. Further, those 
cultural practices are also very healthy for the development of local 
democracy, which is important in community’s disaster governance. 
Based on the experiences of the two communities in the above-men-
tioned areas in post-disaster contexts, this report highlights that de-
mocracy which is practiced from below every day, is an important 
seed for the development of democracy in general context. It could be 
an alternate route for the official democratization, which is commonly 





The research tries to identify democracy that is built from below by 
communities in grassroots level, using post-disaster recovery as the 
context of study. In that purpose, the research is designed to answer 
the following questions:
1.  What are the activities that people across ethnic and religious 
groups engage in post-disaster recovery processes? 
2.  What challenges—related to diversity and differences—do the 
communities have to face in the recovery process? 
3.  How do the communities use their cultural practices to deal 
with the issue of diversity and differences? 
4.  How does the use of communities’ cultural practices help de-
velop the culture of grassroots democracy? 
5.  How are the communities’ cultural practices relevant to 
democratization? 
6.  How can grassroots democracy as experienced by the commu-
nities contribute to the enrichment of democracy? 
RESEARCH METHODS
This is a qualitative research and uses case studies in its approach. In-
depth interviews and direct observation are the main tools to gather 
data. The research is based on fieldwork in Kaliurang, Sleman, Yog-
yakarta, post-the 2010 Merapi volcano eruption, during October 2013 
until January 2014 and in Pondok, Padang, West Sumatra, during Oc-
tober 2013 until May 2014. In-depth interviews and direct observation 
are the main instruments for data collection. 
Kaliurang is the name of a tourism region near Merapi Volca-
no, Sleman, Yogyakarta, consisting of several villages and sub-villages 
in Pakem and Cangkringan sub-districts. Amongst the villages (desa) 
and sub-villages (dusun) being visited for fieldwork are Palemsari, 
Glagahsari, and Panguk, situated in Cangkringan sub-district. In the 
fieldwork, were interviewed 23 people that live surrounding the areas. 
The informants were a mixture of those severely and less severely af-
fected, male and female, lay people and village leaders, Moslem and 
non-Moslem, and young and old generations. 
In Padang, fieldwork research was focused on a city center near 
Chinatown, which is locally called Pondok, Pecinan, or Kampung 
Cina. The main attention of the research is on traditional market, 
namely Pasar Tanah Kongsi, in which inter-ethnic interaction is most-
ly enabled, and inter-community recovery is happened. In order to 
gain another insight, fieldwork was also focused on Chinese residen-
tial area (Pondok), Catholic School, kongsi (Chinese cultural union) 
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office and another traditional market, which is bigger but relatively 
homogenous, namely Pasar Raya, as a comparison to Pasar Tanah 
Kongsi. There are about 30 informants, consisting of Minang, Chinese 
and Javanese ethnics, Kongsi leader, academics, adat (traditional) 
leaders, legislature member, school-teachers, students, and journal-
ists. They are a mixture of male and female, young and old, and rich 
and not rich people. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS
From the fieldworks it is found that, although the two communities 
have different social characteristics, they share similarities in terms 
of ability to manage diversity and differences that rose during the 
periods of post-disaster recovery using their daily culture and social 
mechanisms. The practices of culture that strongly contain the mes-
sages of tolerance, sharing and mutual understanding are the keys of 
the community engagement in the two areas. 
Kaliurang community is, by social characteristics, rural and looks 
more homogeneous compared to Padang. Javanese is the only ethnic 
in that area. Most community members are Moslem, and the rest are 
Christians and Catholics. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Kali-
urang faces less challenge than Padang in terms of social life. During 
the emergency and recovery phases, the community, that is most-
ly Moslem, has to face the issues of religious conversion, especially 
addressed to those who gained helps from the Church or the other 
Christian organizations. Besides to the issue of Christianization, in 
their daily life they also have to deal with the issue of minority within, 
with the existence of minority Moslem wing, namely MTA (Majelis 
Tafsir Alqur’an), in addition to the majority ones, namely NU (Nahd-
latul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah. This is not to mention the problem 
between old and young generations relating to the practices of ritual 
tradition, which leaves the society with the problems of disagreement. 
However, the way the community manages the issues is interest-
ing to discuss as it provides crucial lessons for those who face the sim-
ilar problems. In Kaliurang, serawung (to socialize), sengkuyung (to 
embrace others) and gotong royong (collective works) become the keys 
for the people to maintain community engagement. The community 
understands well that without tolerance and mutual understanding, 
recovery process will run very slow. As the works to tackle disaster 
impacts are huge, people in Kaliurang understand that they need to 
go beyond their identity borders to build effective engagement and 
cooperation in village reconstruction and relocation. As a result, in 
spite of the issues of diversity and differences, Kaliurang community 
recovers quite quickly. 
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On the other hand, Padang community is relatively urban with 
multiple ethnics living there. Minang is the majority one. Chinese is 
the dominating minority ethnic with the number of population nearly 
reaches 3% of the total population of Padang. The rest is Javanese, 
Bataknese, Jambinese, Indians, and Arabians. In Padang, the issues of 
discrimination against Chinese during 2009 earthquake, referring to 
the limited assistance to Chinese, were strong. The issue worsened the 
existing distance between Minang, coined as the native residents of 
Padang, and Chinese, as new comers. This made the tension between 
the two got more apparent. Media attention and community pressure, 
later, had forced the local government to share its resources to assist 
Chinese to reconstruct its residential areas. However, this remains not 
to erase social tension between Minang and Chinese for the issues 
of ethnic and religious differences. In the coming years, both ethnic 
groups had to deal with a hard relationship due to the controversial 
case, in which a Chinese figure known as a non-Moslem was given an 
adat title by one of the adat leaders. 
However, amidst the strong tension between the two ethnic 
groups in Padang in general, in a traditional market, namely Pasar 
Tanah Kongsi located in the corner of Chinatown, there is an interest-
ing picture, in which Chinese and Minang are closely engaged, run-
ning the local economy through trading, and living side by side in 
that area. While in Pasar Raya, another market in the city center that 
is bigger than Pasar Tanah Kongsi, the portrait of relationship be-
tween Minang and Chinese is relatively mixed, in Pasar Tanah Kongsi, 
inter-ethnic engagement looks more striking. Trading collaboration, 
in fact, is not only crucial for reactivating local economy, but more 
importantly for lessening the potential of social friction and violent 
conflict due to ethnic and religious differences. While recovery in Pas-
ar Raya looks quite slow, recovery in Pasar Tanah Kongsi looks more 
quickly. Apart from the fact that Pasar Tanah Kongsi is smaller than 
Pasar Raya, the community’s role in Pasar Tanah Kongsi should not 
be undermined. In that area the peaceful face of Padang city could be 
clearly identified. 
Dealing with this, people assert that raso pareso influences very 
much in the way they have relationship with the others. Raso pareso is 
amongst Minangkabau’s cultural values that underline rational think-
ing, tolerance, and mutual understanding. It outweighs long-run ori-
entation than the short one. It prefers negotiation than open conflict 
and offensive behaviors. Interestingly, raso pareso has not only been 
practiced amongst Minang. It is also popular amongst Chinese and 
become their value, as well. This tightens the two ethnic groups with 
mutual understanding and cooperation. 
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The findings from these two communities clarify us that democ-
racy can live everywhere, in rural and urban areas, in seemingly ho-
mogenous and heterogeneous communities, in trading and farming 
communities, in single and multi-ethnic society, in city center and 
hinterland, in technologically attached and less attached society, and 
in various forms of social and cultural practices. Democracy could live 
in a very simple way and could be very close to everyday life. Democ-
racy from below, therefore, could be an answer for the stagnancy of 
official democracy in developing countries. 
THIS RESEARCH’S CONTRIBUTION
From the findings, this research intends to contribute to the exist-
ing concept and practices of democracy by elaborating what is locally 
practiced in society. This research highlights that cultural practices, 
which are local in their characteristics, initiated from below, and dai-
ly, could be a valuable source for the development of democracy in 
the wider context of political system, which is usually formal and pro-
cedural. Kaliurang and Padang communities’ experiences of dealing 
with the issues of diversity and differences in the context of post-di-
saster recovery have told us that democracy for grassroots community 
is not something beyond or out of their reach. It lives within their life. 
Those communities’ experience at the same time answer the existing 
doubt towards the development of democracy in the third world like 
Indonesia, which is identical with a corrupt administration, an elitist 
political system and oligarchic policy-making. They let us know that 
deep inside the society, there is potential seed of democracy, laying 
within their daily life, that could be developed to support the promo-





This report is about the practices of democracy from below in two 
communities in Indonesia, namely Padang (West Sumatra Province) 
and Kaliurang (Yogyakarta Province). This paper focuses on the con-
tribution of these communities’ daily cultural practices to the devel-
opment of grassroots democracy and its relevance to the promotion of 
democracy in general in state level. The cultural practice in two com-
munities is mentioned to contribute to the strengthening of grassroots 
democracy because it contains the principle of deliberation, namely 
participation, equality and mutual respect that becomes one of req-
uisites for democracy to exist. Raso pareso in Padang that is highly 
influenced by Minang culture, and serawung and sengkuyung in Kali-
urang that is identical with Javanese culture contain the principle of 
deliberation that is fertile for developing democracy in the grassroots 
level. Raso pareso asserts equality and mutual respect, while serawung 
and sengkuyung asserts participation and solidarity. 
The two regions have relatively different characteristics, in 
which Padang is an urban and culturally heterogeneous area, while 
Kaliurang is a rural and culturally homogenous area. However, the 
communities in those regions both have to face similar problems in 
terms of diversity in their daily life. While in Padang it is ethnic and 
religious difference that potentially lead community into conflict, in 
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Kaliurang it is tradition, as well as different school of thoughts in re-
ligion that cause people to be in tension. Such a problem also arose 
when both regions were hit by disaster in 2009 and 2010, respectively. 
Discrimination against ethnic Chinese in Padang and the allegation 
of Christianization in relation to aid provision in Kaliurang, both in 
emergency periods, have also crucial tension in communities. In that 
context, the practices of raso pareso and serawung and sengkuyung 
have encouraged people to avoid further conflict that the potential of 
violence was ceased, and therefore, community diversity management 
could be well operating. 
The cultural practices are not only contributing to communi-
ty-based diversity management, they have also contributed to the de-
velopment of grassroots democracy through the assertion of partici-
pation, equality, self-control, and mutual understanding. Raso pareso 
and serawung and sengkuyung have also been the basis for commu-
nity decision-making, like in the context of post-disaster recovery. 
The experience of community in Kampung Batang Arau in Padang 
post-2009 earthquake, as well as in Palemsari in Kaliurang post 2010 
Merapi volcano eruption, have shown us how these cultural practices 
have helped community to govern collective recovery (public facilities 
reconstruction in Kampung Batang Arau and housing resettlement 
in Palemsari). Given their potentials to encourage community par-
ticipation and deliberation, these practices will be of great benefit for 
encouraging the enhancement of democracy in state level. It is clear 
that the success of democratization in state level does not only depend 
on state’s institution that consists of executive, legislature and judicia-
ry, but more importantly also on community inclusion. Community is 
one of the important locus where political change and transformation 
may be begun. As Törnquist (2006: 235) asserts democracy does not 
only mean the existing rights and institutions as legislature, execu-
tive and judiciary, but more importantly of the well performance of 
these institutions. Grassroots democracy can be a way to strengthen 
the performance of such a democratic institution by enhancing com-
munity’s inclusion in governing process. In addition, the improvement 
of community inclusion in governing processes can be done through 
strengthening the culture of democracy in their daily environment. 
It is realized that the relationship of culture and democracy is not 
that simple nor natural nor automatic. However, given the underlined 
values of the cultural practices that are in line with democracy, the po-
tentials of the cultural practices for grassroots democracy strengthen-
ing should not be undermined. Further, asserting that such grassroots 
democracy may contribute to the promotion of state democracy and 
becomes the alternate route for democratization may sound ambitious, 
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given, for instance, the small scope of that cultural practice in the state. 
However, being small never means being not important. Once widely 
spread, grassroots democracy may be the potential seeds for cultivat-
ing state democracy, given required supports were provided. 
In dealing with this, it is acknowledged that there are some ques-
tions related to the idea of culture and democracy. Weller (2001: 4), 
for instance, identifies some doubts on the compatibility of Asian cul-
ture to democracy for being paternalistic and authoritarian. Weller 
exemplifies that Huntington (1996) addressed the values of authority, 
hierarchy, avoidance of confrontation, ‘saving face’, and the suprema-
cy of state over society and society over individuals (Weller, 2001: 6). 
Confirming Wong (1996) and Kuo (1996), Weller (2001: 7-8) also sees 
that some scholars seem to point out economy instead of culture that 
will encourage Asian countries like China and Singapore to be a dem-
ocratic country. As Nathan and Shi (1993: 95) argue, those scholars 
believe that Chinese culture, for instance, that asserts passivity, igno-
rance of politics and fear of politics will not allow Chinese to advance 
their democracy. 
The similar debate is also specifically found in an academic dis-
cussion in terms of the relations of culture and democracy in Indone-
sia. In Padang, people are strongly tied to their extended family. Prop-
erty is collectively possessed and decision-making is in the hand of 
the elderly in the family (ninik mamak). Such a situation leads to the 
question of equality of opportunity and equality of access to the family 
decision-making that become the core principle of democracy. Sim-
ilarly, although does not assert explicitly if Javanese culture is com-
patible or not for democracy, Anderson (1990) argues that Javanese 
people have different concept of power compared to that of Europe-
ans, which further influences their daily political practices. Anderson, 
for instance, identifies that Javanese community is strongly tied to 
their kings for the belief that the kings are the descendants (titisan) 
of God. This results in the demand for total loyalty to the king. Given 
the development of society, currently, the concepts of king in Javanese 
community do not only cover those that are literally understood as the 
king that rules a (physically-established) palace, as the one that exists 
in Yogyakarta. It has expanded to the local elites, respected figures, 
and village leaders. Because of the assertion of such a model of com-
munity’s loyalty, it becomes difficult to believe that democracy will be 
able to be alive. 
In fact, community is not monolithic. They also do not have 
single face. In Padang, although decision is made by ninik mamak, 
prior execution, there should be approval from bundokanduang (the 
eldest woman in the family that is coined as the mother of all family 
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members), and thus, access to decision-making between men and 
women is equally distributed. In daily life, like in neighborhood life, 
such a practice also exists. In nagari (community) level, bundo kan-
duang is also place in the highest position, which is above tungku tigo 
sajarangan (that consists of ulama/religious scholar, academics and 
adat/custom leader) in community decision-making. Similarly, in such 
a ‘feudalistic’ palace, like in Yogyakarta, the king provides community 
members a place to protest. Of course, there is no such a ‘Western’ 
way of protest, in which people spread brochures containing their 
message to the rule, or stand in front of the palace yelling to the king 
to speak up what they want. In Yogyakarta, people could just give sign 
that they do not agree with the king by sitting in the yard field of the 
palace under the shining sun without saying anything, called tapad-
ede. By doing so, the king would understand that there is something 
needs to be talked with the community. As such, the king invites them 
to enter the palace to talk about the matter. Although the practices in 
Padang and Yogyakarta look simple, it has crucial meaning for gender 
equality and citizenship recognition. 
Given the growing critiques towards the practice of formal democ-
racy in current Indonesia, encouraging democratization through the 
strengthening of grassroots democracy becomes important. It could be 
an alternate route of democratization. As Törnquist (2006) argues, In-
donesia is currently experiencing (formal) democracy deficit, in which 
procedural democracy is still far from yielding a strong representation 
that it still fails to give the highest advantage for community. Politics 
is still very influenced by oligarchy and operated by a few elites within 
particular political dynasty, as can be found in Banten, Kutai kartaneg-
ara, Bantul, and Madura. Agreeing Törnquist, Von Luebke sees that 
the improvement in public participation is not balanced with quality 
improvement in the state’s ability to govern. This becomes one of the 
explanations of why after more than a decade of reformasi, Indonesia 
seems not to experience significant political transformation. 
Von Luebke (2011, 2010) also addresses oligarchy and predatory 
leadership both in national political structure and local governance as 
a factor that hinders the country from having fair and free economic 
competition, as well as democratic governance. Based on his finding 
in some districts in Java, Sulawesi and Sumatra, rent-seeking tenden-
cy of the local political is still strong. Accordingly, Diamond (2010a), 
and MacIntyre & Ramage’s claim (2008) that decentralization in gov-
ernment institutions and competitive elections—as part of political 
liberalization project post-1990s Asian crisis—could be an indicator of 
the massive progress in Indonesian democratization looks too narrow. 
In Von Luebke’s view, current situation of Indonesia is like a mixture 
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of progression and obstruction (2011: 2) signified from the remaining 
massive problems of governance within the agenda of political reform 
in the midst of the few progress of democratization the country has 
achieved. Von Luebke’s assertion (2010: 80) implies that there is still 
no balance between elite’s and community’s role in Indonesian for-
mal democracy. The decision-making elite are still highly dominating 
through their oligarchy network, despite the fact that they are chosen 
through democratic election processes. Meanwhile, community’s role 
and opportunity to get benefitted from daily decision-making is lim-
ited. Elite’s interest collisions then have resulted in the government 
paralysis (Von Luebke, 2010). 
To address such a complexity, it is obvious that there is a need 
for doing something. In this case, encouraging democracy from be-
low through communities’ daily cultural practices could be one of 
the ways, given the facts that Indonesian communities are still tied 
with their culture despite experiencing modernity.1 Democracy from 
below, as Khan asserts, is an opposing form of formal democracy. For-
mal democracy is democracy that is promoted by state. Meanwhile, 
informal democracy, or sometime called grassroots democracy, is a 
model of democracy that is built and practiced outside the formal po-
litical structure, applied in daily life, and becomes the value of soci-
ety. Learning from the Indonesian experience of reformasi in 1998, 
in which community has played crucial role in changing the regime 
from authoritarianism to democracy, it is groundless not to believe in 
community’s role in later (formal) democratization. Indeed, this does 
not mean to disregard other factors, like international organizations. 
With regard to this, it remains important to see how informal de-
mocracy and formal democracy might be related. How does informal 
democracy support the promotion of formal democracy? Informal de-
mocracy may be an alternate route for promoting democratization in 
state level, given the fact that currently it is the corrupt elite that most-
ly dominates decision-making. However, informal democracy may 
also not bear any influence to the strengthening of formal democracy, 
once it does not gain sufficient supports that it needs to function, like 
strengthened representation and improved spaces for community’s 
involvement in decision-making. Nevertheless, what should become 
our concern is not merely on whether grassroots democracy support 
or not supports democracy in state level. More importantly, it should 
be on how to make it supportive to the promotion of state democracy. 
1 Khan, Salman 2012 ‘Democracy from Below vs. Official Democracy’ in New 
Socialist Webzine, November 17. At <www.newsocialist.org/660-democracy-from-
below-vs-official-democracy> Retrieved on July 5, 2014 at 10:50 am. 
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From fieldwork in the two areas, it is known Indonesia has big 
potential to develop its formal democracy that is supported by its 
community’s informal democracy in the grassroots level. Communi-
ty might have differences in social characteristics, as presented by 
Padang and Kaliurang community, but they have the same potential 
to develop informal democracy through their own way and mecha-
nism, that is also potentially contributive to the promotion of formal 
democracy. Kaliurang is rather rural and Padang is urban. Kaliurang 
is known to be syncretic (tend to mix Islamic teaching and tradition), 
while Padang is strict Moslem. Yet, their experiences in tackling social 
issues and problems during post-disaster recovery let us know that 
community, whatever and whoever they are, could be an important 
agent of democracy promotion. They could manage the issues of eth-
nic and religious differences that influenced the recovery process. This 
tells us that in spite of their simple and informal nature, communities 
have potential to be the locomotive of the development of democracy. 
Indeed, this does not mean to say that Padang and Kaliurang are per-
fect examples. In a community, in which the social structure is highly 
featured with the composition of majority and minority, as happens 
in Padang, and with strong communalism like in Kaliurang, the ques-
tion of power relations is unavoidable. However, in spite of the strong 
culture of collectivism, this does not mean that community members 
are not aware of their need as an individual to be counted in com-
munity decision-making, whatever mechanism the community uses. 
The challenge now is how to make such a great potential to be an 
energizer for enhancing democracy in state level that is already domi-
nated by elite, dynasty and particular oligarchy circles. In order to re-
spond to this query, after analyzing research findings with grassroots 
democracy perspective, this report will identify some ways forward as 
recommendations. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions of this study include the following: ‘how does 
community across ethnic and religious groups deal with the issues of 
differences and diversity?’, ‘in what activities do the communities usu-
ally engage?’, ‘how does the community develop grassroots democracy 
in that matter through their daily cultural practices?’, and ‘how is this 
relevant to the enrichment of Indonesia’s promotion of democracy?’. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This qualitative research uses the case study in its approach. Kali-
urang, Yogyakarta, and Padang, West Sumatra Province were chosen 
for the relatively strong cases of ethnic and religious issues, but are 
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relatively successful in terms of diversity management during the 
recovery processes. Fieldwork research in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta, 
post-the 2010 Merapi volcano eruption, was conducted during Octo-
ber 2013 until January 2014 and in Padang, West Sumatra, during 
October 2013 until May 2014. Kaliurang is a name of region near 
Merapi volcano consisting of several villages in several sub-districts. 
Amongst the villages (desa) and sub-villages (dusun) being visited for 
fieldwork are Palemsari, Glagahsari, and Panguk in one sub-district, 
namely Cangkringan. The fieldwork interviews 23 people that live in 
Kaliurang and being disseminated in those villages (and sub-villag-
es). The informants consists of a mixture between those severely and 
less severely affected, male and female, lay people and village leaders, 
Moslem and non-Moslem, and young and old generations. 
In Padang, the focus was on the city center near Chinatown, 
which is locally called Pondok. Sometime, it is called Pecinan (Kam-
pung Cina). The main attention was on traditional markets, namely 
Pasar Tanah Kongsi, in which inter-ethnic interaction was mostly en-
abled. To gain another insight, fieldwork was also focused on Chinese 
residence, Catholic School, kongsi (Chinese cultural union) office, me-
dia, and another traditional market, namely Pasar Raya. 30 people 
have being interviewed, including Minang, Chinese and Javanese eth-
nics, academics, adat (traditional) leaders, legislature member, school 
teachers, high school students, traditional leaders, and journalists. 
These informants are a mixture of male and female, young and old, 
Moslem and non-Moslem, and rich and not rich ones. 
The fieldwork research used direct observation and in-depth in-
terviews as a method of data collection. In this process, the researcher 
interacts deeply with the selected informants to figure out their state-
ments, behaviors and expressions. In the interviews, the main ques-
tions that were asked are mainly as the following:
1.  What activities do people across ethnic and religious groups 
engage in their daily lives?
2.  What challenges related to diversity and differences the com-
munities do have to face in that context? 
3.  How do the communities use their cultural practices to deal 
with the issue of diversity and differences? 
4.  How does the use of communities’ cultural practices help de-
velop the culture of grassroots democracy? 
5.  How relevant are the communities’ cultural practices to 
democratization? 
6.  How can grassroots democracy as experienced by the commu-
nities contribute to the enrichment of state democracy?
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The ata gained from direct observation and in-depth interview will be 
then analyzed using inductive analysis and creative synthesis strat-
egy to discover important patterns, interrelationships, and themes 
guided by analytical principles to immerse creative synthesis (Patton, 
2002: 41). In this research, an expected pattern is the model of democ-
racy at the grassroots level and provision of relevant policies emerges 
from the anticipated synthesis. 
OUTLINE OF THE REPORT
Chapter I is an introduction, which tries to elaborate a justification 
of the research on the academic side. It also presents the significance 
of the study and the strategy used to collect information and data 
during the fieldwork research. Chapter 2 discusses the theory of de-
mocracy from below including definitions, context of the rise of the 
concept, and the significance of concept in the context of democrati-
zation in developing countries. Chapter 3 reveals the social settings 
of Kaliurang and Padang. Chapter 4 elaborates more specifically the 
situations of post-natural disasters in the two areas, in order to let the 
readers identify the complexities the communities have to deal with. 
Chapter 5 discusses problems of social relations that rise during the 
recovery periods. This is to let the readers know that deep inside the 
community, problems of post-disaster are more complex than what 
they usually seem. This could include the overlapping of disaster-re-
lated policy with the politics of ethnics and religions. Chapter 6 ex-
poses about the communities’ strategies to deal with the problems 
in their social environment, using their cultures and social mecha-
nisms, and how this has implications on the strengthening of local 
democracy and disaster governance. Chapter 7 concludes what has 
been discussed on harnessing democracy from below, as an alternate 





This part discusses briefly the concepts of democracy from below, 
being related to cultural practices and the Asian context, especially 
Indonesia. Of course, before further discussing what is meant by de-
mocracy from below, why it is important, in what context the idea of 
democracy from below rises, and what challenges the concepts might 
be dealing with, it is important to clarify the idea of democracy and 
democratization. This chapter is organized as follows. First, it discuss-
es the concept of democracy, democratization, and democracy from 
below. In addition, the discussion of democracy challenges, and how 
they relate to democracy from below, is included. Second, it discusses 
cultural practices and democracy, mainly towards the debates of cul-
tural practices compatibility with democracy. The last, it discusses the 
idea of community diversity governance and democracy from below. 
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW 
THE DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Democracy can be thought as an ancient idea of governing, in which 
the Greek generally is considered as the founder (Wollheim, 1958: 
225). As Wollheim (1958: 226) argues, democracy is about the form of 
governments, and not the form of societies, although, as Held (2006: 1) 
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asserts, it puts the people at the center of the government processes. 
Because putting ‘the people’ in the center of the government, democ-
racy then is seen contrary to monarchies and aristocracies. In Held’s 
words, it is the government by the people, from the people and for the 
people, and therefore it underlines people’s participation in the gov-
erning processes. The next term that is very close to democracy is de-
mocratization and democratization process. Democratization means 
the transformation from non-democratic to democratic governments 
(Grugel, 2002: 6). Democratization process is a process through which 
a participative and accountable government is promoted. 
PROBLEMS RELATED TO DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Although the definition of democracy as ‘the rule by the people’ has 
been generally accepted, and even becomes the most widely adopt-
ed system of government in current world, this does not mean that 
it lacks problems. The similar question is addressed to democratiza-
tion and democratization processes. The main challenge towards the 
idea of democracy as the rule by the people is mostly seen on appli-
cation and applicability aspects. Unfortunately, the questions about 
application are mostly departed from the procedural views, instead 
of the substantive ones. Held (2006: 1-2), for instance, spotted some 
questions that lead to the continuing debates, like who are considered 
to be ‘the people’; how would ‘the people’ participate; how to make 
conducive participation in such a democratic system; what are the 
requirements for participating in the government, and whether the 
participation is coerced or voluntarily; etc. Although these questions 
are important, it seems that they are still centered in one focus, name-
ly how democracy is going to be practiced, which is procedural in 
nature. This can be seen for instance from the following debates on 
what is the best mode of democracy, as direct or representative, uni-
cameralism or bicameralism, voting or consensus, two or multi-party 
system, and so forth. Consequently, there are many democratization 
projects in later periods that are directed to renew political recruit-
ment, reform electoral systems, change party system, and establish 
new institutions supporting for election like election commissions 
and election monitoring bodies. 
Direct election in Indonesia implemented since 2005 replacing 
representative system, following political reform in 1998, is a clear 
example of how democratization project has been focused much on 
democracy procedures and application. Although direct election in In-
donesia is seen to enhance citizens’ participation for providing them 
opportunity to directly top executives and legislature members by their 
own, as well as widening the opportunity for the citizen to get involved 
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in political party for the increasing number of political parties, com-
pared to those in the New Order, it is criticized not to have significant 
impact on widening opportunity for the citizen to get involved in daily 
governing processes. Direct election is seen to be merely a machine 
that produces and reproduces elites that forms a new mode of oligar-
chy and political dynasty in decision-making circles. Citizen remains 
being far from the access to influence the government, while elites are 
fighting each other to master decision-making areas. Direct election 
is also regarded to not give significant meaning for the promotion of 
democracy in Indonesia, except in the enhancement of the demand 
side of democracy (by citizen and civil society), which unfortunately 
is not always accommodated by policy makers. It is even coined to 
mess up political structure for encouraging fragmentation between 
either elites or masses. This is not to mention problems like money 
politics, which has been becoming rampant since direct election was 
introduced. This causes us hard to refuse what Nordholt (2005: 29) 
proposed as the definition of reformasi as the changing from ‘order to 
disorder’, instead of the changing from ‘non-democratic to democrat-
ic government’. Unfortunately, agreeing to Nordholt (2005: 38-42), a 
change like this—from representative democracy to direct democracy, 
from centralization to decentralization—is what institutions like the 
World Bank and the Ford Foundation coin as the indication of de-
mocratization success. Indonesia is frequently mentioned as one of 
the countries that experience the most successful democratization in 
Asia. Meanwhile, it is clear that as long as the change does not have 
direct impact on the widening of spaces for citizen to influence and 
participate in decision-making, it would be meaningless. 
Democratization through reforming democracy procedures, like 
elections, party system, representation system, and so forth, is im-
portant. However, it is surely never enough. Democracy is about value 
(Hiley, 2006: 2), and thus, it may present in any part of the world with 
different naming and ways of application. Consequently, there should 
be no Western domination in defining what democracy is, although 
the term is clearly from the Western world, as well as how it should 
be practiced. In that regard, Wollheim’s argument that democracy is 
about the form of governments, instead of the form of societies, might 
need to be reexamined. What does he mean by government and gov-
ernment form? Does he mean by formal government and formal insti-
tution, the ones that are established in and by the state? If this is so, 
therefore, he has failed since the beginning to address the meaning 
of democracy. Although democracy is related deeply to the governing 
process, it is actually more about the quality of the governing, namely 
to be participative and accountable. Moreover, this may exist in the 
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so-called ‘governing system’ outside the state institution, like in daily 
community. Of course, this does not mean to perceive the dichotomy 
state / non-state as merely something opposed. In many cases, the 
state and non-state, as well as the formal and informal ones, are often 
influential and interlinked to each other in forming democratic sys-
tem (Scalapino, 1996: 227), although it is not rare, too, to find them 
being in contrary position. Far before the so-called state was estab-
lished, such a governing system has even earlier established in society. 
The society might not use the term democracy, but this does not mean 
that they do not have one. Raso pareso in Minang community that 
underlines mutual respect, for instance, has been practiced far before 
the state called Indonesia was established in 1945. Similarly, rembu-
gan, which means community participation and dialogue, has long 
been practiced in Javanese society, although they were governed by a 
kingdom, which in Western perspective is categorized as aristocratic 
and monarchy. 
The second problem, which is still related to the previous one, is 
a wide tendency for narrowing the meaning of democracy and democ-
ratization, including the ones applied in Asia and Indonesia, as liber-
al democracy and democratization. By definition, liberal democracy 
imagines free and equal citizens, in which that freedom and equality 
are guaranteed by formal laws, as well as institutions (Talisse, 2005: 
80-81). As individual interest and preference tend to be conflicting, 
these laws and institutions are also meant to govern them though a 
fair public policy. The primacy of individuals in liberal democracy has 
a consequence on the lessening assertion of the state in democrati-
zation processes. Further, this also undermines something related to 
collectivism and communalism, for being seen potentially to deprive 
individual autonomy, which is the key ingredient of (liberal) democ-
racy. In Bell’s view, the equation of democracy with liberal democra-
cy, that is manifested in the US-led promotion of human rights and 
democracy regardless of local habits, needs, and tradition, is equal 
with the blind faith. In addition, although criticizing liberal democra-
cy and democratization promoted by the World Bank and its related 
partners, Nordholt (2005: 31), for instance, also confirms the view that 
communal culture of Indonesia that is patrimonial in its nature, as 
well as its history, is very influential to the failing project of Indone-
sian democratization, which for me sounds liberal, too. If he does not 
believe in liberal democracy and democratization, I think, he should 
not put Asian (Indonesian) culture as the main explanation of democ-
ratization failure. He rather is better to state fairly that there is a lag 
between the culture of Western and Eastern communities that coerc-
ing liberal democracy in democratization project is not a good idea. 
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This means that there is another thing that is necessary to be doing to 
encourage the enhancement of democracy—as a value, not merely as 
a procedure—in Asian countries like Indonesia. 
Although liberal democracy might be one of the crucial practices 
of democracy, it is surely not the only answer for democracy promo-
tion. Society has their own history that they are formed as they are 
like now. People in Asia, for instance, are formed by the history that 
outweighs collectivism than individualism, so that expecting them to 
adopt successfully such a ‘Western’ liberal democracy in current pol-
itics will look not realistic. Nevertheless, this does not mean that by 
nature, Asian cultures are not compatible to democracy. Like in West-
ern cultures, there are some parts in Asian culture that are compati-
ble to democracy—even though they are dominantly characterized by 
collectivism—and there are some others that are not. Aristocracies, 
for instance, is not exclusive to Asian communities. There are such 
forms of governments in Western countries, too. Similarly, this does 
not mean that there is no space for respecting individual autonomy 
and the separation of public and private sphere in Asian cultures. Reli-
gious conversion in Kaliurang community, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, for 
instance, is considered as a private matter that neighbors, although 
they see the matter, will not consider taking it as their business. They 
respect their neighbors’ choice by not talking about it in public place, 
although they will be very intense to see the neighbors in other social 
activities. Therefore, some critiques pointing out Asian cultures as 
an explanation of the failure of current democratization, as Nordholt 
(2005: 31-33), Day (2002), and Harris-White (2003) argue, sound not 
to make any sense. There is a need for carefulness in seeing cultures 
and democracy promotion in the cultural contexts other than the ones 
in the Western. 
DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW: AN ALTERNATE ROUTE FOR 
DEMOCRATIZATION
Responding to the discrepancies in perceiving democracy and democ-
ratization, which are procedural in definition, formalistic in terms of 
approach, and dominantly liberal in nature and ideology as mentioned 
formerly, it is important to find a way to fulfill the gap. Törnquist 
(2006: 230), for instance, identifies some ways proposed to respond 
to the issues. Amongst them is by strengthening strong and liberal 
middle and/or working classes. However, this might be ending up with 
the same failure of democratization as currently happens as discussed 
earlier, for the embeddedness of collectivism in Asian cultures. An-
other way, that might be useful as an alternative is by strengthening 
democracy from below. 
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One of the practices of democracy from below can be found in 
Latin America. Referring to Latin America experience, the idea of de-
mocracy from below rises because people aspire to search for forms 
of democracy that will allow them to control their lives and livelihood 
(Kaufman and Alfonso, 1998: 1). Searching by their selves will be like-
ly to help them find a politically and culturally compatible form of 
democracy. It would be possibly different if other parties, like donors, 
interfere the process of searching, even directing it. From this asser-
tion, it becomes clear that democracy from below relies on the people 
to empower themselves to be the promoter of democracy. Of course, 
Latin American countries have different contexts with those in Asia. 
They have a long history of community struggle. However, this does 
not mean that developing democracy from below in Asia is impossi-
ble. Asian communities have great potential of collective actions, as 
a basic form of democracy from below, for their strong collectivism, 
to be the seeds for building democracy from below. Indeed, collectiv-
ism does not automatically create collective action because it requires 
collective consciousness. At the very bad situation, collectivism can 
end up with democracy weakening, like in the forms of patrimonial-
ism and clientelism, for being trapped in collective unconsciousness. 
Asian collectivism, therefore, can be a good and, of course, bad locus 
of collective action depending on how it is supported with collective 
consciousness. 
From the above-written argumentation, it can be underlined that 
democracy from below is democracy that is initiated by, in and for 
community, supported by their daily cultural practices, and encour-
aged by their own political contexts. Such an understanding, howev-
er, should not be messed up with direct democracy, although Schmid 
(2003), for instance, asserts that the two are associated. Direct de-
mocracy can be very formalistic, and therefore, not matches with the 
understanding of democracy from below. In formalistic view, direct 
democracy is contrasted with representative democracy, defined as a 
democracy procedure, in which people grant a mandate to their rep-
resentative, who is usually selected through general elections, to make 
a decision on behalf of them in the governing processes (Schumpeter, 
2003: 250). In democracy from below, community is the agent for their 
own selves, and they develop democratic system in an informal way. 
By term, democracy from below can be equated with grassroots 
democracy, informal democracy, or daily democracy. It is contrasted 
with official, formal, or state promoted democracy. John Keane (2004: 
15) and Liebert and Trenz (2008) clarifies what is called ‘from below’ 
as something related to the field of civil society—a space other than 
market and the state, meanwhile what is meant by ‘from above’ is the 
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field of government or laws—the state. Considering the above-written 
understanding of democracy from below (see Tao, 2005: 64; as cited 
above), and the reflection gained from Latin American experience, by 
definition, democracy from below can be said as community’s self-em-
powerment to promote participation, equality and accountability in 
the governing processes based on their respective cultural and politi-
cal contexts. This definition answers Liebert and Trenz (2008: 1) that 
defines democracy from below as, ‘the process that translates demo-
cratic norms and practices into citizen’s practices’. Although the defi-
nition is said to put citizen in the center of democracy processes both 
as actor, agent, and beneficiary (Lister, 1999), it is still unclear who 
does, ‘the translation of democratic norms and practices into citizen’s 
practices’. If democracy from below is defined that way, there is a pos-
sibility that the state may do so, and if it is the case, it is no longer 
democracy from below rather, it is democracy from above. Therefore, 
I underlined the definition of democracy from below as self-empower-
ment to address community as the main actors, and in governing pro-
cess to broaden the scope of democracy from below’s practices. Just 
to make clearer, what I meant by governing processes in this context 
is either in the scope of internal community environment, village en-
vironment, as the smallest representation of the state, or the state in 
general. Internal community environment can refer to neighborhood 
context that is daily in the nature. Meanwhile, the state environment 
is more formally featured. Given such an understanding, democracy 
from below therefore does not limit its understanding of governance 
only in the scope of formal institutions—directly related to the state, 
but more importantly in informal sphere, that is not related to the 
state’s laws, or if related it is happened in indirect way. 
Of course, the differentiation of formal and informal democracy 
does not merely imply the categorization of democracy ideas. It is 
also deeply related to the political context that circumscribes the two 
concepts to arise. In most communities, what is coined as formal usu-
ally is identical with coercion. This also works for democracy. When 
democracy is formalized, it usually ends up with formalistic manners, 
instead of with embedded behaviors. Informal democracy imagines 
that democracy becomes the culture of society in governing their dai-
ly decision-making. In addition, in Indonesian context, people have 
long distrusted in formal democracy. The mechanisms of formal de-
mocracy through elections and legislation processes are believed to 
have been contaminated with elite’s money politics (Ziegenhain, 2009: 
42-46). Expecting formal democracy in current Indonesian politics 
will only result in desperation. Although informal democracy does 
not cure all deficiencies related to formal democracy, it is expected to 
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boost optimisms towards democratization in Indonesia. Sometime, 
informal democracy even could be an effective way to influence deci-
sion-making in formal sphere, which in formal mechanism of democ-
racy may take longer time. Having personal relations with legislature 
members, for instance, could help citizen to make a contact with the 
minister, once they find out particular problems that need for quick 
response. Nihayatul Wafiroh, for instance, is known to be a very active 
legislature of the 2014-2019 in Indonesia that allows her Facebook 
friends to report anything related to labor policy to be delivered to the 
Minister of Labor, who is from the same political party with her. Some 
other ministers in Indonesia also use twitters to communicate with 
the citizens. Somehow, this can overcome barriers in formal democ-
racy in which making a contact through a formal way needs longer 
bureaucratic procedures. 
CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW
Despites its advantages, there are some problems with democracy 
from below from both theoretical and practical views. Firstly, as de-
mocracy from below uses to be informal, there is no guarantee of its 
sustainability. Formality, which asserts law as a binding rule of every-
body, in spite of its strictness, may offer certainty, compared to infor-
mality. Still related to the first point, secondly, democracy from below 
assumes too much that culture will be relatively stable. Meanwhile, 
communities in globalized world generally face great challenges of 
changes in cultural practices. Although Padang remains matrilineal, 
and Kaliurang remains being identical with Javanese culture, some-
how, its practices experience shifting and squeezing, being replaced 
with a new, economical and practical ones. On the other hand, thirdly, 
there is a wide tendency in which informal democracy strengthen-
ing is equated with changing communities’ cultures. Meanwhile, it 
is widely believed that changing communities’ culture may take very 
long time to happen, and therefore, promoting democracy from be-
low may take longer time, too. Fourthly, there is a need to be aware 
of the issue of power. Democracy from below imagines communi-
ties to be fully conscious and aware of their political circumstances. 
Meanwhile, some parts of the communities might be not interested 
in politics. They might not yet be fully conscious of politics that they 
withdraw themselves from political discussions, but conversely, they 
may also be very conscious that they could even read the complexities 
of power relations within their internal environment, and thus, they 
choose not be active, simply for maintaining social relations. Given 
the context of Asian communities that underpin collectiveness, such 
circumstances are also sensible. 
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Another important issue that needs to take into account is de-
mocracy from below in order to operate somehow is said to require 
active citizenship. Brannan, John, and Stoker (2006: 993) define active 
citizenship as engaging people in decision-making processes to have 
say in the planning and delivery public service, and involving them 
in their communities to improve outcomes of that political engage-
ment. However, this may bear some dilemmas. Some people criticize 
that citizenship is actually not to make citizen stronger. It is rather to 
support the state. Meanwhile, state is never neutral. Sometime it is 
even used few elite. In the name of the state, elite tries to pursue their 
interests. Indonesian experience during New Order has proven that 
the policy of citizenship strengthening was not more than about the 
state’s effort to strengthen the state’s hegemony. Therefore, rather than 
asserting citizenship, it might be helpful to underline community con-
sciousness. The concept requires community to be aware of the state 
policy and the politics behind, i.e. how they are counted and taken 
into account, which is a requisite for self-empowerment in grassroots 
democracy. 
Although democracy from below is not free from problems, the 
option it offers to be an alternate route of democratization remains 
worth considering, so that the distance between community and 
formal democracy will be shortened. It is expected that democracy 
from below will be more accommodative for different cultures to en-
dorse democracy principles, especially given the critique that state-
led democracy adopted by the government is generally donors-mind-
ed. Although not easy, building democracy from below sounds more 
promising than seemingly simply adopting liberal democracy for de-
mocratization. In that instance, what the promoters of grassroots de-
mocracy do is clearly not to change their culture to be compatible to 
democracy, but to collect some aspects of their cultural practices that 
suit with democracy principles and make them as the seeds for further 
democracy promotion. 
CULTURAL PRACTICES AND DEMOCRACY (FROM BELOW) 
The relationship of culture and democracy has always been a big 
question in political science discussions. The main questions that 
include, whether cultural practices have positive contribution to the 
development of democracy, or not? and whether it is democracy that 
contributes to the development of civic culture?, have always been 
difficult to answer. However, some scholars have made some efforts to 
reveal the puzzle. Bebbington et al. (2004: 188) argue that culture may 
affect the structure of governance and resource allocation through the 
social structure it entails, as well as social capital it contains. Cultural 
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practices that are embedded in networks of social relationship, as 
Bebbington et al. assert, could be the crucial ground for the growth of 
social action, political participation, and political pressure that could 
expand the access of community to the available resources (pp. 190-
191). Cultural practices collect people that have the similar political 
interest that it could harness social movement (p. 191). Based on their 
field research in Java and Jambi, Indonesia, Bebbington, et al. (p. 202) 
found that culture might be engaged with social mechanism in co-pro-
ducing services and governance, as well as in creating strategies to 
tackle social tensions. 
A decade prior Bebbington, et al. study, Putnam published his 
work, Making Democracy Work (1993), and has been seen as a cor-
nerstone for the study of culture and democracy using mixed meth-
odology (the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods). 
Putnam has addressed crucial points on the relationship of culture 
and democracy, in which civic culture has been significantly import-
ant to enable democracy to work. What he means by civic culture is 
trust, network, and reciprocity, which he term as social capital. In his 
study, Putnam compared North and South Italia; the region that has 
different culture of community associations, and found that region 
that has better civic association, namely North Italy, has built better 
democracy than the other one. His later work, Bowling Alone (1995), 
strengthens his previous claim on the positive relationship of culture 
and democracy. In Bowling Alone, Putnam addressed the reverse sit-
uation of North Italy in North America, in which society has experi-
enced the weakening of social capital, and thus potentially weakens 
American democracy. Based on these studies, Putnam means to assert 
that the higher civic culture, the better democracy, and the weaker 
civic culture, the worse democracy. 
However, some other scholars challenge the argument that assert-
ing culture may contribute to the development of democracy. Koel-
ble (2003: 204-210) asserts that Putnam’s work contains some crucial 
flaws in methodology, in which dependent and independent variables 
were mistakenly specified, that its conclusion, namely the positive 
contribution of culture to democracy, becomes questionable. Citing 
Laitin, Koelble (p. 207) argues that Putnam mixed the definition of de-
mocracy with effective governance. Koelble (p. 206) adds, Putnam is 
too romantic at heart towards community. In his view, Putnam looks 
to look at culture as static and passive entity, while for him culture is 
activity and changing practice. Muller and Seligson (1994) also see 
the same, in which the claim of the positive contribution of culture 
to democracy is not that convincing. Using statistical methods, they 
rather see that instead of influencing democracy, culture is influenced 
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by democracy. Trust, for instance, increases following democracy 
strengthening, identified from the better law enforcement. Strength-
ening this argument, Koelble (2003: 210) asserts that trust is a prod-
uct of rational examination, instead of by nature a cultural product. 
Considering these, Koelbe, Muller and Seligson at last come up to the 
conclusion that socio-economic structure is more striking to influence 
democracy development than culture. 
Responding to this, I have to agree to some points Koelble has 
highlighted, but also pose some questions to the other points. Koel-
ble’s point of culture as a dynamic instead of static, active instead of 
passive, fluid instead of solid, and changing instead of unchanging ac-
tivity and practice does make sense. However, just because culture is a 
changing practice, does then it mean that culture could not contribute 
to the development of democracy? Socio-economic and power struc-
ture also always change. Why is the same objection not addressed to 
them? I think, culture is not only a changing activity. It is also a com-
plex entity. It is not monolithic, in addition to its changing nature. 
There is power relations and structure in cultural practices. The cul-
ture of speaking halus in Javanese community, which means to speak 
politely to the older or those who are prominent in society, is clearly 
a token of how political is a cultural practice. So, cultural practices 
should not be perceived as neutral. Symbol and rituals as practiced in 
speaking halus, which look static in Koelble’s view, contain the similar 
sense of politics (Adeney-Risakotta, 2005). Speaking halus in Javanese 
community is seen not only to represent power structure between the 
elderly and the young, and between elite and laypersons. It is also a 
political tool for lay community to build an access to elite to influence 
decision-making. In some instances, it is even an effective way to cool-
ing down social tension. Speaking halus also experiences some chang-
es in diction and expression. Yet, the changes do not always mean to 
erode the political sense it entails. 
Secondly, related to the relationship of culture to democracy, I 
agree with Koelble, Muller and Seligson’s argument that it may be too 
far to claim that culture that is practiced in daily life will influence 
the development of democracy—provided what they mean by democ-
racy is formal democracy/state-led democracy that is liberal in the 
nature. However, will it be the same if it is informal/grassroots de-
mocracy, or as I state previously democracy from below? Meanwhile, 
it is clear that community participation in collective decision-making 
in neighborhood environment is highly related to their daily cultural 
practices. Rembugan is a cultural practice in Javanese community, in 
which people get together to make decision related to common good. 
However, it is also a practice of community participation and equality 
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in collective decision-making. As such, not only do we need to be crit-
ical in seeing culture and democracy, we also need to be very careful. 
In the big discussion of cultural practices and democracy (from 
below), the rule of looking at culture and democracy not only critical-
ly but also carefully is obviously crucial. Otherwise, this will lead us 
to the same generalization flaws of Huntington (1993) that sees the 
Western culture is more compatible than the Eastern to promote de-
mocracy. It is admitted that democracy is a Western construct. There-
fore, it should not be a surprise should Huntington views that Western 
culture that is open, liberal, equal between people, and impersonal is 
more likely to match with the principles of (for sure, what he means is 
liberal) democracy. However, asserting that the Eastern cultures, like 
Asian cultures, that are communal, hierarchical (feudal), and identi-
cal with violent may bear generalization flaws. Moreover, as we be-
lieve in the idea that democracy is about value, principle, and political 
conduct, instead of procedures and forms, we should be very flexible 
in seeing the ways community practicing democracy, albeit the fact it 
is originally a Western construct. In this context, I agree with Neher 
(1991: 51) that, ‘Real democracy was not destroyed by a traditional 
culture but by corrupt, power-hungry politicians who initiated repres-
sion and authoritarian institutions to retain their positions’. 
Because communities throughout the world are varied, there will 
be no same uniform in practicing democracy, even though they en-
dorse the same democracy principles, namely community participa-
tion, equality and accountability. What about individual autonomy? 
Of course, this is very tricky. Collectivism in Asian communities will 
easily trap scholars to judge them not supporting for democracy. The 
question is, whether Asian collectiveness is always coercive—which 
obviously means an interruption to individual autonomy? The an-
swer is not. In Javanese community, the key is laid in rembugan, a 
communicative process in which community deliberation is allowed. 
Although collectiveness is more valued, individual choice remains re-
spected, as long as there is rembugan (dialogue; discussion) that high-
lights individual reasoning prior choice making. And more important 
questions are, whether it is always impossible to promote democracy 
in collective community? What is valued in democracy, the idea of 
autonomy, or the idea of individual autonomy? If we say the idea of 
individual autonomy, we will automatically come up with the conclu-
sion that Asian communities do not suit with democracy. Although 
there is always a strong issue of power relations in collectiveness, this 
does not mean that collective community could not be autonomous. 
When autonomy is seen only to match with individuals, rather than to 
collective unit of community, does that automatically mean that those 
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individuals are free from power structure? The answer is not. Thus, it 
becomes clear that what are striking in democracy are the principles, 
not the procedures to endorse the them. Getting used to live in indi-
vidualist or collective world will not reduce community’s opportuni-
ty to develop and enjoy democracy. Therefore, instead of convincing, 
Huntington’s argument pointing out Asian cultures as the constraints 
for developing democracy sounds groundless. This reflects his lack 
information towards the details of what he calls as the Asian cultures. 
Nevertheless, I have to admit fairly that sometime responses 
proposed to Huntington’s argument, especially from Asian political 
leaders, also look reactionary. Instead of becoming alternatives, the 
arguments somehow sound ideological. The idea of Asian values that 
is proposed by Mahathir Muhammad (Malaysian former Prime Minis-
ter), and is supported by Soeharto (late Indonesian former President), 
and Lee Kuan Yew (late Singapore former Prime Minister) to rebut 
Western scholars’ view of Asian cultures’ incompatibility to democ-
racy, is seen to lack of academic ground, although, agreeing with Bell 
(Bell, 2006: 52-53), expecting politicians to be academic is also unfair. 
Recalling my previous argument about culture, Asia is also not mono-
lithic. Although Asian countries are generally featured with aristocra-
cies in their past, and, therefore, it is believed that this is still influen-
tial to the current cultures, it has other detailed parts of cultures and 
social relations that are practiced in daily life. Although similarities of 
detailed practices with the general ones are possibly found, differenc-
es might also exist. 
Unfortunately, the generalization flaws in defining cultures and 
Asian cultures are not exclusively found in Western scholars and Asian 
politicians. It is a classic problem of international relations and politi-
cal economy. War against communism led by the United States in the 
Asian countries that were considered leftist, like Indonesia, Vietnam, 
and People Republic of China during the 1950s to 1980s can be said 
as one of fatal result of the flaws. International development agencies, 
which are generally Western-minded, like the World Bank, Ford Foun-
dation, and so forth, following the wars against communism, also be-
come the other pioneers of ‘one-size-fits-all’ perspective in democracy 
promotion. Massive democratization projects after Asian crisis in the 
late 1990s that is not yet succeeding is believed to some extent to have 
relations with these institutions’ frameworks about Asian culture and 
politics. Instead of empowering, their democratization programs are 
seen not to be more than a shortcut for liberalization, which unfortu-
nately historically and culturally insensitive. In Indonesian context, the 
firing of authoritarian leader—Soeharto—that was followed with rad-
ical changes in party system, from three-party system to multi-party 
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system, and the change in top executive election system from repre-
sentative to direct election, the issuance of decentralization law, mas-
sive reforms in regulations like in terms of foreign investment, oil and 
mining governance, and extractive contracts, that they sound more lib-
eral—but were introduced as if they are for promoting transparency, 
openness, and free and fair competition, regardless of national inter-
ests, and so forth are amongst the examples of liberalization projects 
during the democratization phases. Approaches like this, besides leave 
an impression of cultural and historical insensitivity of donors, also 
imply donors’ impatience in facilitating the programs, generally called 
result oriented, instead of process oriented. Of course, the introduction 
of NPM (New Public Management) in development agencies that de-
mands for high efficiencies should also be mentioned as another expla-
nation. From this assertion, we can see that it is not simply the culture 
that is problematic in democratization, but more importantly the ways 
we promote it, the approaches we use; the framework we have; the 
perspective we build; and the methods we apply. 
In that regards, the idea of democracy from below is proposed 
to provide alternatives. It tries to recognize culture comprehendingly 
together with its complexities. As culture varies, it understands that 
the ways people use to express the idea of democracy also vary. Apart 
from the social structure that tends to be hierarchical, gotongroyong 
(solidarity, social cooperation, and mutual help), rembugan (discus-
sion or dialogue), serawung (to be open in social life), and sengkuyung 
(to embrace others) are seen to help community to enhance partici-
pation and equality, as well as building trust, cooperation, and sensi-
tiveness amongst each other. They are also very rich in expressions. 
‘Menang ora umuk kalah ora ngamuk’ (those who win should not be 
arrogant, and those who lose should not get angry) is an instance of 
Javanese proverb asserting the rule of games, like in election, negoti-
ation and dialogues. Democracy from below could also take place in 
various venues. Neighborhood, village, traditional market, kampung 
and school environment, are an instance of the space, where democ-
racy from below operates in society. Panchayats in Kerala, India, is an 
instance of the practice of village democracy, which interestingly is 
still rich with the local value, culture, and tradition (Mohanty, 2007: 
18). Sekolah Tumbuh is another instance of elementary and junior 
high schools in Yogyakarta, Indonesia that practices democracy not 
merely as a procedure of teaching and learning, but also as value in 
building social relations amongst the school’s elements (head mas-
ter, teachers, students, canteen owners, and so forth) that is enriched 
with Javanese culture (Udasmoro et al., 2011). Indeed, by asserting 
this, it does not mean to against Western cultures and practices. Some 
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practices offer crucial lessons for Asian communities’ promotion of 
democracy. Citizen Report Card (CRC) in Australia surely inspires 
public monitoring. However, it is the sense of public involvement in 
monitoring process—in whatever level of governance, as well as in 
formal and informal ways—that should be the center of attention, in-
stead of merely the utilization of Report Card as a means for citizen to 
conduct monitoring. Because Asian communities, including Indone-
sia might have different culture, experience and constraints of using 
card in monitoring processes. 
Reflecting from the above-written arguments, this explains us 
that what should be firstly born in mind in democracy/democratiza-
tion is that it is about value, not about procedures. This is not saying 
that procedures are not important. It is procedures that follow the 
values in order to be endorsed, and not the other way around. De-
mocracy from below does not see complexities of cultural practices as 
constraint to promote democratic values; rather it underlines cultural 
richness that may contribute to the development of democracy. 
COMMUNITY DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY FROM 
BELOW
Amongst the daily issues communities in Padang and Kaliurang have 
to face, including in the context of post 2009 earthquake in Padang 
and 2010 Merapi Volcano eruption in Kaliurang, which is the time 
frame when this research was conducted, is related to diversity and 
diversity governance. After discussing democracy, democracy from 
below and its relationship with cultural practices, therefore, it is cru-
cial to discuss the idea of diversity, community diversity governance 
and its possible relations with democracy from below. 
By concept, diversity refers to differences in society, which could 
be of religions, ethnicity, traditions, races, gender, and beliefs (Leh-
ning, 1997: 222). Banks et al. (2005: 17) describes diversity as, ‘The 
wide range of racial, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious varia-
tion that exists within and across groups that live in multicultural na-
tion-states (See Figure 1)’. Banks et al. add, in smaller society, differ-
ences remain exist but in narrower range at least involving gender and 
social status. Banks et al. mention that colonialism, migrations, and 
international trading encourage the increasing diversity in a nation 
through cultural amalgams and hybrids. Although generally known as 
a Muslim country—in which Muslim is the majority in it—Indonesia 
is diverse. By religion, besides Islam, there are Christianity, Hindhu, 
Buddhist and other local religions in Indonesia. By ethnicity, there are 
Java, Sunda, Batak, Minang, Ambon, Flores, Dayak, Papua, and so 
forth. By race, there are Malay, Chinese, Papua, and so forth. 
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Diversity is not a problem. However, it remains in need for being 
managed. Once diversity fails to be managed, the impact could be very 
serious. Not only physical lost, this may also let to the separation of 
the states. Besides secession, war, conflict, discrimination against mi-
nority, and even genocide are amongst the worst risks the communi-
ties may have to bear because of failed management of diversity. The 
problem is the state is not always present to overcome anything hap-
pens in diversity-related issues in communities. And, if they may do, 
they may be in the side of majority, which is clearly not healthy for de-
mocracy. It is too easy to mention the example of the state’s absences 
in diversity management or the state’s diversity miss-management in 
Indonesia. The kicking out of Shi’a followers in Madure, East Java two 
years ago, so they are no longer staying at their own homes, and must 
reside in sport stadium in another district; violence against minori-
ty Ahmadi Muslim in some regions in Indonesia; repression against 
ethnic Chinese since colonial era to reformasi and post-reformasi, hor-
izontal wars in Sampit (Kalimantan), Poso (Sulawesi), and Ambon 
(Moluccas) are amongst the pictures of unmanaged or miss-managed 
diversity. Losing family members, materials, and opportunities to gain 
education and employment are of direct impacts the communities 
have to overcome. 
Since the state is not always present, or if they were present, they 
were present wrongly due to biased policy, getting community able to 
govern diversity by their selves in their own environment is necessary. 
Interestingly, in some communities in Indonesia, there are actually 
mechanisms created by their ancient ancestors to tackle social ten-
sions and conflicts that may be caused by sentiments against tribes, 
ethnicities, religions, geographical origins, and so forth. It is acknowl-
edged that some of these cultural practices eroded for the policy of 
Bhineka Tunggal Ika (‘unity in diversity’) imposed by the state during 
New Order, which is actually no more than about uniformization of 
Indonesia—make all communities in Indonesia to be like Javanese 
and to adopt Javanese culture and social system in communities’ so-
cial and local political system, and some others are changing. Yet, in 
some others, the practices remain existing, like bakar batu in Papua. 
In Ambon, people try to revive pela gandong after years of erosion, 
and in Java, people remain practicing rembugan. Cultural practices 
like this need to be developed to equip community’s ability to manage 
diversity. 
In relation to democracy from below, community diversity gov-
ernance enriches some basis needed to promote it, in addition to 
the practical advantage it offers like the lessening of conflict poten-
tial. Firstly, it encourages equality between community members 
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regardless of their ethnicity, religion, and geographical origins (En-
slin, Pendlebury, and Tjiattas, 2001: 118). Secondly, it promotes in-
clusion, in which all community members are allowed to take part in 
community dialogues (Young, 1996: 122), which is a fertile ingredient 
to develop democracy from below. Thirdly, it encourages communities 
to build mutual understanding referred as willingness to deliberate 
together in a certain common focus (Isin, 2002: 125). 
Community already has networks ranging from family webs to 
neighborhood. Furthermore, in the community some places connect 
between community members. Schools, traditional markets, mosques, 
churches, community security post, rice fields, cattle product fields, 
sport field, forest, and community meeting house (balai kampung in 
Javanese are important places where community members use to meet 
up. Daily community issues like road building, bridge fixing, mosque 
establishment, rice field cultivation, daily trading, children education, 
art performance, and so forth are also spotted in these areas. The use 
of these networks as a space and resource for endorsing democra-
cy principles can be so strategic. Rembugan in Java, musyawarah in 
Padang, bakar batu in Papua, and pela gandong in Ambon, happen in 
these places. In that occasion, sengkuyung (in Java) and rasopareso (in 
Padang) fulfill the processes to enable community members to share 
their ideas, participate in community discussion, and make collective 




SOCIAL SETTINGS OF PADANG  
AND KALIURANG
This chapter discusses the social characteristics and post-disaster sit-
uations of Padang community, West Sumatra Province and Kaliurang 
communities in Sleman, Yogyakarta Province, Indonesia, which are 
relatively different. In general, Pondok community in Padang city 
consists mostly of Minang and Chinese ethnic living in urban area, 
while Kaliurang community consists of Javanese people living in rural 
area. However, both have similarities in terms of the risks to natural 
disasters. The presentation of social characteristics post-disaster situ-
ations of the communities being studied is aimed to give the readers 
the background information of the practice of democracy from below, 













1. West Sumatra Province | 2. Indonesian capital, Jakarta | 3. Special Province of Yogyakarta | 4. East 
Timor State
Source: <http://www.maars.org/news/chronicles/05-02/wildside01.jpg> Retrieved on September 30, 2013 at 12.55.
*The word ‘Papua’ is deliberately used to replace the word ‘Irian Jaya’ mentioned in original version of map. The author 




Padang city is the capital of West Sumatra Province. It consists of 11 
sub-districts, including Bungus Teluk Kabung, Lubuk Kilangan, Lu-
buk Begalung, Padang Selatan, Padang Timur, Padang Barat, Padang 
Utara, Nanggalo, Kuranji, Pauh, and Kototengah. Its total population 
is 833,584 in 2010. Most population of Padang is Minangkabau ethnic, 
usually shorted as Minang, but a significant number of ethnic Chinese 
minority, Javanese, Bataknese, Indians, and Arabians also comprise 
the demography of the city. In spite of the minor number of the pop-
ulation in Indonesian demography, Minangkabau is known to be one 
of the ethnics in Indonesia for their contribution of its central figures 
to the making of Indonesian nation state (Hadler, 2009: 1-2). Some 
Minang figures have been known to be the founding fathers of Indone-
sia, as Mohammad Hatta, who is the first vice president of Indonesia, 
Tan Malaka, who is the lead figure in Indonesian leftist movement and 
Buya Hamka and Haji Agus Salim, who are the great ulama (Moslem 
scholar) and are Moslem politicians in Indonesia. Their roles are men-
tioned as prominent as Javanese politicians’ roles. 
As an old city, Padang has an interesting portrait of city planning, 
which later contributed to the structure of ethnic politics. Netherland 
colonial government left a big sea 
port, which played important role 
in international trading in the 
past, and involved mostly Chinese 
traders in its activities. This made 
area surrounding the port as the 
center of economy with Chinese 
as the main actor. Based on the 
colonial policy, for economic pur-
pose, Minang ethnic were placed 
in kampong (neighborhood en-
vironment), and lived separately 
from Chinese. Similarly, in New 
Order era, for political motive, 
Chinese were prohibited to stay 
at kampong. This is later believed 
to cause ethnic segregation in the 
social life of Padang. 
Sociologically, ethnic Mi-
nang, that comprises mostly 
Padang population, is matrilineal. 
It means that the genealogy of a 
family member is drawn from the 
1. West Sumatra Province | 2. Padang
Source: <http://bto.depnakertrans.go.id/kad/peta/pic/Padang%20
Hilalang.jpg> Retrieved on September 30, 2013 at 13:36.
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line of mother. The role of the oldest mother in Minang family that is 
called Bundo Kanduang, is supreme. She becomes the protector of the 
whole family and the owner of the family property. As Bundo Kanduang 
is the mother of everybody, her property is also accessible to everybody, 
not in the sense of possessing, instead in the sense of taking the advan-
tages, like harvesting the farming production for marriage celebration, 
financing education, curing those getting sick, and so forth. Indeed, 
what is coined as a matrilineal society in Minangkabau is not a pure 
matrilineal one, in which female is the only center in community. There 
is still men’s role. However, his role remains oriented for female family 
members. The oldest brother of mother is called ninikmamak. Ninik 
mamak is responsible for the welfare of all kemenakan, which are the 
daughters of his sisters. Ninik mamak have to take over the responsi-
bility of his nieces’ parents, including to take care of their daily needs, 
education and safety, should the parents are no longer able to do so, like 
because of having died, losing job, and so forth. 
Therefore, unlike Javanese that is very dependent on neighbors, Mi-
nang tends to rely mostly on extended family. In spite of the transforma-
tion of the form of Minang extended family to the nuclear one, the func-
tion of extended family does not significantly erode. Although family 
members do not stay at one big family house any longer, the obligation 
to take care of extended family does not automatically disappear. Bundo 
Kanduang’s house (the oldest woman in the extended family) is still the 
place of everybody in the family. Ninik mamak (the oldest brother of moth-
er) is still obliged to be taking care 
of their kemenakan (the daugh-
ters of ninik mamak’s sisters). 
This causes familial bonding in 
Padang—and in the other West 
Sumatran districts—is still strong. 
Further, the sense of neighbor-
hood becomes rather spatial in 
Padang especially, instead of so-
cial. In this sense, their relation-
ship with neighbors that is out of 
family lines is mostly functional, 
or encouraged by needs. There-
fore, categorizing Padang com-
munity simply as gemeinschaft or 
gesellschaft (Tönnies, 2001), as we 
mostly can apply with Kaliurang 
community, is never easy. It does 
not count social collectiveness as 
Source: <kpud-padangkota.go.id> Retrieved on 
September 30, 2013 at 1:15 pm.
Picture 3
Map of Padang’s Sub-Districts
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primary as in Kaliurang community, Sleman, Yogyakarta. This has re-
sulted in somewhat distancing relations in Padang neighborhood. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean there is no binding instrument 
in Padang neighborhood. In this regard, religion, trading, and sports 
play crucial role. Pengajian (qur’anic studies) is the space that collects 
community members from different ethnic and social backgrounds 
in neighborhood environment. Javanese, for instance, becomes easily 
accepted as they use to be Moslem. In neighborhood environment, 
Javanese migrants are also known to be active attending pengajian. 
This seems to be the explanation of why Javanese are mentioned to 
be easy adjusting with Minang culture, at least being compared, for 
instance to Chinese and Bataknese, who are usually Protestants and 
Catholics. Trading and sports are the other important space that could 
meet up Minang and the other ethnic groups. However, to what extent 
these kinds of activities could make ethnic blending effective to the 
strengthening of social cohesion still needs for further scrutiny.
Moreover, at the same time, Padang community is known to be 
very strict in terms of religion. It is widely recognized that Padang and 
West Sumatra with their Minangkabau culture generally are identical 
with Islam. Adat basandi syarak, syarak basansi kita bullah is a com-
mon value that is accepted in Padang (and West Sumatra) community. 
This means that tradition is rooted from Islamic law, and Islamic law 
is rooted from the holy book. Such an idiom, in fact does not end up 
merely as an idiom. It is practiced in daily life. In wider social context, 
it is even noted that being Minang also means being Moslem. Losing 
Islam means also losing Minang identity. Marriage, for instance, is an 
institution, in which the importance of religion is apparent. Unless 
the couple is Moslems, marriage proposal will not be approved. Oth-
erwise, the couple will be ‘thrown away’ (dibuang) from their Minang 
clan, and is not regarded as the part of the clan anymore. They even 
will be deemed as not to be a Minang anymore and will lose their 
rights of inherited property. 
This kind of rule is also happened in daily life, in which the way 
the people treat their religion is the same as the way they treat their 
identity. Sometime, not fulfilling religious obligation is one thing, 
but advocating for religion when it is humiliated is another thing.1 
In grassroots political life, religion also becomes the reference of the 
community to decide their political support in general election and in 
regional development. The defeat of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla in Pres-
idential Election 2014 in West Sumatra, amidst the great victory in 
almost all Indonesian provinces, is believed to have correlation with 
1 Interview with Zainal Arifin on May 10, 2014, in Padang. 
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smear campaign being blown up by Prabowo Subiyanto-Hatta Radja-
sa’s team that said Joko Widodo as Christian and being backed up by 
Chinese businesspersons. Meanwhile, it is clear that Joko Widodo and 
Jusuf Kalla are pious Moslems. Similarly, the failure of Lippo Group 
to invest in mall, hotel and hospital development in Padang due to 
mass protest is also linked with the issue of evangelization. 
In terms of social life, referring to Durkheim’s idea of organic soli-
darity (1994), social relations in Padang is known to be very need-driv-
en. In that case, interest plays crucial role and having relations with 
the others must have rational purpose. Social relationship that is very 
family-oriented unlike Javanese that is very neighbor-oriented has 
contributed to the shape of such an endogamous society. Indeed, ur-
banization might also play crucial role in forming such a social rela-
tions. However, the factor of tradition seems to play more important 
role than urbanization itself that equating this with the western con-
cept of individualism is quite improper. For most Minang, social rela-
tion is not for the sake of collectiveness itself, as Javanese community 
uses to practice. Social relation is built for the purpose of economy, 
knowledge, and information accesses.2
Relationship with the other ethnics, like Chinese and Javanese, 
for instance, is not defined as merely for social harmony, as Javanese 
people use to define social relations. It should bring some things, like 
skills in trading, access to goods supply, and so forth. As Chinese is 
seen to be the source of knowledge, especially in trading, and a good 
partner in local economy, Minang relatively looks not interested in 
confronting Chinese, at least openly. That is why, as Erniwati (2011) 
argues, Chinese could relatively survive in Padang, in spite of the issues 
of religious differences and social segregation they have to encounter. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that problems related to religion 
in daily life have decreased. In some occasions, this also triggers social 
tensions. As Olszewska (2010) sees, although Chinese ethnic has en-
tered Padang since the colonial era, ethnic blending remains difficult 
to happen. Religious difference is kept to be the distancing wall be-
tween Minang and Chinese. Chinese is not allowed to live in Padang, 
but in specific areas, like Pondok and particular perumahan area (real 
estate). Pondok includes some areas in Padang Barat, Padang Selatan 
and Padang Timur sub-districts. They live together with Nias, and the 
other minority Minang ethnic.3
2 Interview with Montosori, editor in chief at Padang Express, on November 22, 2013, 
in Padang.
3 The number of population in each sub-district is 59,895; 61,003, and 84,231. 
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The complexities of social relations in Padang are not only re-
lated to Minang and Chinese. It also deals with Javanese, Batak and 
Nias. It is interesting to view how people like look at the others differ-
ently. Dealing with inter-ethnic relations in Padang, A female trader 
C in Pasar Raya said, ‘Never try with Chinese. They are mean. We are 
not allowed to enter their houses’.4 Sirmis, a Minang man that works 
as a coffee shop owner, said that, 
Javanese people like to have dispute very much. When something is a bit 
not right, he will easily get angry. This causes dispute between individuals. 
For instance, when pick up our vehicles after parking, Javanese used to 
get mad if we say we do not have any money. This is different with Padang 
(Minang). They will say it is not a problem. Chinese has different nature. 
They are individual. Minang tends to blend with everybody. Some Chinese 
are willing to blend some are not. Some other Chinese are also very kind, 
like always saying thank you after shopping. Sometime, there are also Chi-
nese that are rude, like being not grateful after getting helped to get out 
from parking area. Chinese will make contact (with the others) if only they 
have particular interest and need. So, we also respond like how they act; 
as long as it does not lead to further dispute. I am rare having communi-
cation with Chinese, but we greet each other. Chinese is very rigid in terms 
of money. Minang is relatively flexible.5
Faizal, a Minang male trader, on the other hand, admits that lan-
guage becomes the crucial factor. He said it is easier to have trans-
action with Minang because of the similarity in terms of language. 
Sometime, for him, it is difficult to understand Chinese. However, he 
also shares his view about Chinese. For him, Chinese is identical with 
prosperous life. In his opinion, Chinese limits their interactions only 
with their fellow Chinese. They are afraid to interact with Padang 
(Minang), because Padang (Minang) is equally intelligible (with Chi-
nese). He sees, Chinese is often suspicious with Minang, and they 
only make connection with security officers to buy safety. That is why, 
in his opinion, Chinese is not open in social interaction.6
The relationship with Chinese also gets hard currently for the is-
sue of Lippo Group that enters Padang to invest in hospital, hotel and 
supermarket development. People believe that Lippo Group hides 
their Christianization agenda behind this investment projects. In the 
4 Interview on November 13, 2013, in Padang.
5 Interview on November 18, 2013, in Padang.
6 Interview on November 14, 2013, in Padang.
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case that is known widely as Siloam case (the name of the hospital 
Lippo Group would like to build in Padang), Yeyen Kirab, a Minang 
woman who is also a mosque activist, said, the project is merely to 
muddle through Minang religious life. She does not believe in the 
development Lippo Group would conduct in Padang.7 She identifies 
James Riyadi, the owner of Lippo Group, as a dangerous man that 
has an ambition to Christianize 50% of Indonesians.8 The claim of the 
government that Lippo Group project will absorb about 3 thousands 
of unemployed citizens of Padang is not good news for her. She rather 
worries about the impact of this on Minang religiosity. She feels sure 
that those workers would merely be employed in blue-collar sectors. 
Moreover, the area where Lippo Group supposes to develop includes 
9,000 acres. This is unbearable for her.9
Contrary to this, Suwarni, a Javanese female trader in Pasar 
Raya, said that Minang is generally hypocrite. She sees that unlike 
Chinese, Minang are not honest in trading. She admits, this does not 
apply to all Minang, as some of them are also honest. Yet, she feels 
that Minang is hard in negotiation in trading, especially when they 
bargain the price of a good. Based on her experience, this is different 
with Chinese, who is negotiable, as long as they like the quality of the 
goods.10 Susi, a female Chinese, confirms Suwarni. She said that Chi-
nese does not like to tell a lie in trading. She also sees that Minang 
tend be demanding, in which they like receiving what they already 
have it.11 On the other hand, Ines, a female Chinese, also said, she 
feels not comfortable when Minang undermines the way she prays.12
Albert, a Chinese politician, said that it is not easy to identify 
what is the root of the problematic relations between Minang and 
Chinese. It is like chicken and egg cycle, he says. He says that Chinese 
is actually open to social relations. Therefore, saying Chinese as ex-
clusive is not proper. He admits that some Chinese limit their social 
relations. However, for them, this is not always the case. The import-
ant question for him is whether, is Chinese exclusive or is excluded? 
He underlines mutual understanding as a necessary strategy to deal 
with this issue.13
7 In an interview on November 16, 2013, in Padang.
8 In an interview on November 16, 2013, in Padang.
9 Interview on November 16, 2013, in Padang.
10 Interview on November 13, 2013, in Padang.
11 Interview on November 15, 2013, in Padang.
12 Interview on November 20, 2013, in Padang.
13 Interview on November 23, 2013, in Padang.
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Responding to this, Montosori said sometime what happens be-
tween Minang and Chinese is misunderstanding and miscommunica-
tion. He exemplifies, in Chinese view, gambling, for instance, is an or-
dinary thing; meanwhile, for Minang it is a sin as it is prohibited based 
on Islamic teaching. Somehow, he adds, Minang also lack of discipline 
in business. He sees Chinese focus on one particular business field, 
while Minang follow the trend of market. Therefore, in Padang, in 
his opinion, Chinese business is more sustainable. In fact, given their 
experience and knowledge during their migration in the other islands, 
Minang should be as skillful as Chinese in Padang business.14 In addi-
tion to Montosori, Amir, editor in chief of Padang Today, said that the 
limited support of the government to harness inter-ethnic relations, 
including in the post-disaster recovery, is also influential to the hard 
relationship of Minang, Chinese and the other ethnic groups. In his 
opinion, the government focuses too much on physical matters, but 
rather ignorant to the issues, which are very strong during emergen-
cy and recovery periods in Padang.15 Sometime, the government even 
becomes part of the problem of inter-ethnic relations. The banning of 
gate building in Pondok worsens the relations between Minang and 
Chinese, although it is clear, it is originally about misunderstanding 
on the gate building permission letter.
In addition, Padang is actually known for their strong culture of 
raso pareso. Literally, raso means feeling, assumption, or taste, while 
pareso means evidence, checking tool, and rationality. This is close to 
what Javanese people usually call as sungkan (hesitation, to consider 
the others’ feelings, or to take into account the others’ thoughts). No 
matter how strongly they resist the Chinese, for instance, because of 
religious difference, they will not kick them out, unless they do want 
to go out by their own selves. Similarly, no matter big the problems 
they have to deal with the other ethnic groups, as long as it is not 
about humiliation, and hurting their self-esteem, they will not get 
tempted to frontal offending.16
A male Minang trader in Pasar Raya (Raya market) said, although 
within the bottom of his heart he does not like Chinese (especially 
because of their religion), he will not reject them when they want to 
have economic transaction. He said, he will behave well, as long as the 
Chinese people also behave well. 17 He said, his cultural value, namely 
14 Interview on November 22, 2013, in Padang.
15 Interview on November 23, 2013, in Padang.
16 Interview with Zainal Arifin, May 10, 2014, in Padang.
17 Interview on October 15, 2013, in Padang.
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raso pareso requires him as a Minang to behave well to the others. 
Maskota Devi, an Anthropologist of Andalas University, defines raso 
pareso as an ability to check always our own feeling with the others’ 
feeling, as well as to check assumption with proven evidence, and to 
balance emotion with rationality. 18 In her perspective, this explains 
why Minang is hardly involved in open conflict. Nevertheless, she un-
derlines that this does not mean there is no potential of social violent 
conflict in Padang. Inter-ethnic relation is an area she addresses that 
seems to be prone to such a social tension. In that regards, she asserts, 
raso pareso is a social practice that functions to be conflict prevention 
mechanism. 
KALIURANG
Kaliurang is a tourism destination is in Sleman district, Yogyakarta 
Province, Indonesia. Based on Sleman Statistical Bureau, in 2011 the 
total number of population in Sleman district is 1,125,369. Kaliurang 
is one of the most significant tourism areas in Sleman district. It is sit-
uated in Hargobinangun village, Pakem sub-district. However, volca-
no tour business in Merapi area are getting expanded time to time, not 
only including several villages in Hargobinangun, Pakem sub-district, 
but also reach some tourism areas in Cangkringan and Turi, which 
are geographically close one another. If Pakem and Cangkringan are 
known to have volcano tourisms, Turi sub-district is known to have 
successful agriculture tourism, which is a combination of farming ac-
tivity with tourism business. Unfortunately, tourism areas in several 
villages in these three sub-districts also become the first risky zone to 
Merapi volcano eruption for the very close distance to the volcano’s 
peak, which is less than 5 km.19
In Pakem sub-district, the villages that are categorized as the first 
zone include Purwobinangun (consisting of Dusun Turgo, Kemiri, and 
Ngepring) and Hargobinangun (consisting of Dusun Kaliurang Barat, 
Boyong, Kaliurang Timur, and Ngipiksari). They have 8,579 and 8,289 
population respectively (2010). In total, Pakem sub-district’s popu-
lation was 38,361 in 2011. Villages in Cangkringan sub-district that 
are very near to the volcano include Umbulharjo (consisting of Dusun 
Kinahrejo, Pangukrejo and Gondang), Kepuharjo (consisting of Dusun 
Kaliadem, Petung, Jambu, and Kopeng), and Glagaharjo (consisting of 
Dusun Kali Tengah Lor, Kali tengah Kidul, Srunen, and Singlar). The 
18 In an interview on May 11, 2014, in Padang.
19 MNC TV News ‘Lintas Petang’ 2010 ‘Status Naik Jadi Awas, Warga Diungsikan [As 
the Status (of the volcano) Turns to be ‘Watch Out!’ the Community (surrounding the 
volcano) are moved out]’.
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total population in Cangkringan sub-district is 33,162 (2011). Mean-
while, in Turi sub-district the villages that are categorized as the first 
zone include Wonokerto and Girikerto (consisting of Dusun Ngandong, 
Tritis, and Ngangring) with 8,904 and 7,712 population respectively in 
2010. The total population of Turi in 2011 is 40,183. 
Most of people in Kaliurang and its surrounding villages work in 
farming areas or producing cattle. Kaliurang farmers are known as one 
of the best producers of cow milk. Meanwhile, Turi and Cangkringan 
communities are known to be successful snake-fruit farmers. Some 
of them focus on vegetable farming. However, currently, farming and 
cattle production have not yet been optimally active due to the Merapi 
volcano eruption impact. Both the farming and cattle production ar-
eas were mostly burnt with almost nothing to be left post the eruption. 
Nowadays, some of the people in Kaliurang and its surroundings try 
to survive through running a new profession in local tourism as jeep 
drivers or ojek (motorcycle) drivers, while preparing for agriculture 
and cattle production reactivation. Vegetable farming, home industry, 
and logging plantation are what currently being developed in society. 
Living as farmers in rural areas have shaped the community to 
have close relations with one another. As many other rural Javanese 
in Yogyakarta (and other regions in Javanese Island), people in Kali-
urang are highly attached to their neighbors. There is Rukun Tetangga/
RT (literally means neighborhood harmony) that collects households 
in one neighborhood environment association. It is the smallest col-
lective unit in community, in which daily neighborhood activities are 
conducted, like ronda (daily neighborhood security activity), kerja 
bakti (weekly collective environment cleaning activity) and yasinan 
(monthly collective prayings). Women also have collective activities, 
like in arisan (collective saving) and pengajian (Qur’anic study). For 
youth, there is paguyuban muda-mudi (informal youth association) 
that focuses on social and art activities, like kerja bakti and art per-
formance. In teh situation of post natural disaster, collectiveness can 
be clearly seen in evacuation as well as in reconstruction phases. Al-
most all infrastructure reconstruction, that includes road, mosque 
and bridges involve collective participation of the community. Collec-
tiveness, as Durkheim (1994) conceptualizes, is an important mode of 
social relations, which will rise more strongly in the situation of crisis 
and disaster (Durkheim 1984: 77). For Javanese community, includ-
ing Kaliurang community, collectiveness is not only about to organize 
people. It is also about social tie. Therefore, respecting for neighbors 
and maintaining social harmony between community members is a 
must. They said that ‘family’ is those living in the closest areas, which 
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genealogy, but residing in distance areas. It can be said, borrowing 
Tönnies’s concept of social relations (2001), people in Kaliurang are 
gemeinschaft, in which the relations among the community members 
are relatively personal (in contrary to professional/impersonal), col-
lective (in contrary to individual), and intimate. 
By ethnicity, people living in Kaliurang region and the surround-
ings are mostly Javanese. As Javanese people, they put traditions and 
rituals prominent in their lives. Javanese traditions as selametan (of-
ferings for peace and grace seeking) and nyadran (praying for the dead 
family), are amongst the regularly practiced rituals. All of these ritu-
als are done collectively. It could be done in neighborhood environ-
ment level, sub-village level, and village level. Sometime, selametan 
and nyadran are not only comprised of offerings and prayers, but also 
added with the sacred art\show, like wayang (wooden-made puppets 
show). People conducted nyadran at least one a year prior and during 
Ramadhan, while selametan is conducted in particular months during 
the Javanese year. Traditions that are conducted collectively are seen 
to be able to unify people as one community because it binds people in 
collective rituals could enclose the members of society to forming the 
social solidarity between them, for people share the same interests, 
goals, and responsibilities. 
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In terms of belief, although most of the community members re-
main in with keeping their Javanese tradition, they also embrace Is-
lam as their official religion at the same time. Other than Islam, some 
of them are embracing Christianity and Catholicism. Since embracing 
one of the formal religions (amongst the five official religions, namely 
Islam, Christianity, Catholics, Hindu, and Buddha) is set compulsory 
by the state, combination of traditional religion and official religion 
sometime becomes a choice. In the case of Kaliurang community and 
its surrounding neighbors, Javanese tradition and Islamic teachings 
are practiced together, creating what scholars call as syncretism. 
Somehow, tension rises because tradition and Islamic teaching 
sometime are contradictory. For instance, while tradition allows peo-
ple to pray under the tree or in the river, Islamic teaching prohibits 
this as it only teaches to pray only to Allah (Almighty God). Mosque 
or house is then mentioned as an alternate place to pray. Tension 
amongst community members between those, who obey more the tra-
dition and more on Islam, is unavoidable. Yet, so far, it does not create 
violent conflict as people see having good relationship with neighbors 
is more important than blindly advocating for their faith. As a result, 
tradition and religion becomes inseparable. Such a model of religious 
belief is known to be typical in Javanese society. 
In terms of social life, religious and village leaders are equally 
important in the community. Religious leader is more than a leader 
in prayer. They are also the place, where questions about life will be 
addressed. Similarly, village head is not merely official leader of vil-
lage government. They are the parent (orang tua in Indonesian, or 
wong tuwa in Javanese) of society. Somehow, village head does not 
only have to handle businesses related to public service, but also those 
related to social life, ranging from taking care of one of the family 
members in his society that is sick, handling the legal matters of his 
community member that is involved in a traffic accident, and medi-
ating families and community members that are involved in conflict. 
Therefore, the relationship of the community and their village head 
is beyond professional matters, unlike the Western concept of formal 
leadership. Village head’s responsibility reaches personal areas (based 
on unwritten consensus). Consequently, those who are appointed or 
elected as village head are usually those with good characteristics, like 
having good attitude and sharp knowledge, and being wise and char-
ismatic. This also applies to community leaders under village-head 
coordination, like neighborhood and sub-village leaders (Ketua RT—
Rukun Tangga—and dukuh). 
Another interesting aspect to discuss relating to Kaliurang com-
munity is their culture. As Javanese people, Kaliurang communities 
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are known to be halus (soft, sincere, or tender), sopan (polite), but-
notassertive. They are very indirect in expressing what they are think-
ing, feeling and wanting. They try their best not to commit something 
thought as saru (tidakpantas in Indonesian, and ‘improper’ in En-
glish), and to say something kasar (rude). In wider social life, this has 
implication on the relatively minimized conflicts between neighbors. 
People do like harmony (kerukunan in Javanese and Indonesian 
language) and unity (persatuan). Therefore, serawung and sengkuyung 
in society is very common. Serawung is to socialize, unite with the 
other community members, and close or narrow down the social dis-
tance. Blending with the other neighbors in ronda (community safety 
guard) and social gathering is something common to find. Sengkuyung 
is to embrace the other community members, who are in difficulties, 
to lift up the burdens of our neighbors, to give them necessary helps, 
and to include them in social activity. People also get involved in col-
lective activities like gotong royong and arisan. Gotong royong, which 
means collective works that is identical with mutual help and cooper-
ation, uses to be practiced regularly. Arisan is collective saving activity, 
in which people meet together to devote their money and the other 
agreed belonging periodically. When it comes to their turn after being 
randomly drawn, they can take back the collected savings. 
Interestingly, Javanese culture as such influences much the dai-
ly politics of the people, which is also very indirect and soft (halus). 
In the case of people’s protest to the king, as underlined previously, 
for instance, people do not directly state their rejection to particular 
policy of the king. They rather sit and being quiet in the palace yard. 
As such, the king will understand there is something that needs to be 
talked. The king then will call the people to enter the palace and let 
the people express what they are thinking. This seems to influence 
the way people, in the villages, express their protests. People hard-
ly express their rejection to village government head directly. They 
usually try to show their loyalty first, then following it with trying to 
find a way to insert their aspiration usually in the midst of informal 
conversation. This also works the other way around. When a village 
government head has a policy, which is potentially resisted by the 
community, he usually approaches someone, usually a prominent fig-
ure in village, to persuade the community members. For them, direct 
expression is seen rude—the opposite of soft. Lobi meja makan (dining 
table lobby) as President Joko Widodo practiced when he was still 
becoming Surakarta’s mayor in 2005-2010 is a very popular example 
in this matter. Instead of directly instructing street vendors to relocate 
to another designated place, Mayor Joko Widodo chose to talk to the 
traders in lunch session. At first, the mayor did not talk at all about 
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the relocation. He understood well that this is not going to work. Af-
ter a series of lunch session with the traders, he bit by bit touched 
the issue to talk with. And, after more than 50 sessions of lunch, the 
traders could no longer reject what the mayor wanted. Of course, this 
is not without conditions. The relocation is designed to provide other 
necessary facilities for the traders that it would help them adjust with 
the new trading area. In Hudayana’s perpsective (2011), this is what in 
Javanese society called asglembuk, referring to a political strategy to 
influence others by pleasing them first, either in positive or negative 
sense, instead of by assertive and open argumentation, either for good 
or bad purpose. The core substance of glembuk is actually to win the 
heart of others. This is a very indirect diplomacy, as people do not say 
explicitly what they want. Sometime, they do it with jokes, instead 
of coercion. Leaders and masses both use glembuk to exert their in-
fluence and to address their demand amongst each other, for open 
expression is counted saru. 
From the above-written explanation, it becomes clear how dif-
ferent Padang and Kaliurang communities are. By ethnicity, Padang 
is heterogeneous, while Kaliurang relatively looks homogeneous. 
Padang is an urban area, while Kaliurang is a rural one. Padang com-
munity relies mostly on trading and small-scale industry, while Ka-
liurang community relies mostly on farming, cattle production and 
volcano tourism. They also have different perspective on social rela-
tionship and religion. Padang community is relatively family-oriented 
and very strict in Islam, while Kaliurang community is very neigh-
bor-oriented and outweighs Javanese tradition than religion. Never-
theless, both the communities have similarities in terms of having 
relationship with the others. While Padang community has raso pare-
so, Kaliurang community has what is called as sungkan, serawung, 
sengkuyung and gotongroyong, of which meanings are similar, namely 
to take into account the others’ feeling and thinking in social relation-
ship. These aspects will be explored later on community mechanism 
to deal with the impact of disasters, and how they contribute to the 
strengthening of local democracy in society. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POST-DISASTERS SITUATIONS  
AND SOCIAL RELATION COMPLEXITIES  
IN PADANG AND KALIURANG
Both Padang and Kaliurang are prone to natural disaster risks. How-
ever, both regions face different risks of disaster. Padang is prone to 
earthquake, tsunami, and flood, while Kaliurang is prone to Merapi 
volcano eruption, storms, and earthquake. This part discusses brief-
ly post-disaster situation in the two communities, which specifically 
being related to earthquake in Padang in 2009 and Merapi volcano 
eruption in Kaliurang in 2010. Interestingly, both regions have also 
similar problems in terms of social relations, although it is widely 
known that Padang is relatively heterogeneous, while Kaliurang is 
homogeneous, either by ethnicity or by community religious beliefs. 
This part presents the general picture of post-disaster situation and 
social relation complexities the communities have to face during the 
emergency and recovery periods. Some problems have existed prior 
disaster, but then persisted, or even aggravated in recovery periods, 
and influence daily relations of community in collective recovery. This 
is found, for instance, in the case of ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese 
tension in Padang, which was heightening during emergency phases, 
and inter-generational friction in Kaliurang in terms of local tradition 
practice, which remained influential during recovery periods. The dis-
cussion of post-disaster situations and complexities is meant to be the 
context information for further discussion on cultural practices and 
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grassroots democracy strengthening. The discussion is important as 
disaster does not only have impact on physical buildings but also the 
daily social relations and functions, which sometime are more com-
plex than we used to imagine, and of course, need for being governed. 
The discussion of such an issue is aimed to give a deeper portrait of 
post-disaster dynamics of diversity in society. 
In the first part, this chapter discusses post disaster situation in 
Padang, and social relations complexities related to discrimination 
against minority ethnic Chinese follow afterward. The second part dis-
cusses post-disaster situation in Kaliurang, and social relations com-
plexities related to tensions between Muslim and Non-Muslim, as well 
as between young and old generation follow afterwards. This chapter 
is closed with the reflection on Padang and Kaliurang communities’ 
experiences of dealing with daily social relations issues, being related 
to the idea of diversity and democracy from below. 
PADANG
POST-DISASTER SITUATION
The geographical location of Padang in the west coast of Sumatra 
has made it as one of the most risky areas for earthquakes and tsuna-
mis in Indonesia. The disaster issue has been very crucial in Padang, 
especially because of the administrative status of Padang as the cap-
ital city of West Sumatra Province that also becomes the center of 
economy, education, government and resettlement. And, Pondok, as 
the Chinatown of Padang that becomes the focus of this research, is 
an area in Padang that has high population density and becomes the 
center of local trading, which is also the most prone to earthquake 
and tsunamis. It is noted that the functioning of Pondok as the cen-
ter of economy in Padang has occurred since the colonial era, based 
on the city planning set up of the colonial government. The policy is 
economic in orientation, for Pondok is very near to Padang sea port, 
named Teluk Bayur. 
Finding out that Pondok has been very risky to earthquakes, albeit 
its strategic potential for developing local economy, currently, people 
start to develop the eastern area, which is hilly and far from the coast 
to avoid the risk. Yet, the economic magnet of Pondok has not yet dis-
appeared, mainly because the main economic actors, who are mostly 
Chinese, still reside in Pondok. Post-2009 earthquake, hotels and su-
permarkets development in Pondok get more intense and it turns to be 
not only the center of Padang economy, but also Padang local tourism. 
Fast and vast development of Pondok surprises everybody, as in 2009, 
when earthquake attacked Padang in the afternoon on September 30, 
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Pondok was collapsing and its community, especially ethnic Chinese, 
was known to bear the worst impacts of disaster. 
The 2009 earthquake itself caused an impact of 383 death tolls 
and made the massive destruction of public facilities buildings, gov-
ernment offices, and community residence (detailed information 
of earthquake victims per sub-districts can be seen in Table 1. Pon-
dok, which includes some areas in Padang Barat, Padang Timur, and 
Padang Selatan sub-districts, has the highest number of death toll, 
as can be seen from table 1. This is where most Chinese ethnic re-
side. Another high death toll is found in Lubuk Begalung and Kuranji 
sub-district. Not only having the highest number of death toll, Pondok 
also became the most destroyed area. For people in Pondok, emergen-
cy and the first periods of recovery are noted to be very hard for the 
very slow response of the government (Alfirdaus, 2010). They finally 
could access to assistance in the second or third year, when recon-
struction phases has been started. Gradually, they could restart their 
business activity. In the fourth year (2013), the sense of what is called 
as ‘normal’ life start to regain. Below part discusses a more detailed 
description on post-disaster situation in Padang.






1 Bungus Teluk Kabung 0 8 0 38 0
2 Lubuk Kilangan 0 5 31 32 0
3 Lubuk Begalung 1 40 24 60 0
4 Padang Selatan 0 35 42 43 0
5 Padang Timur 0 41 109 113 0
6 Padang Barat 0 81 110 264 0
7 Padang Utara 1 28 52 31 0
8 Nanggalo 0 27 10 59 0
9 Kuranji 0 36 29 38 0
10 Pauh 0 13 1 32 0
11 Kototengah 0 19 23 61 0
Others Unidentified Address 0 11 0 0 0
Outside Padang 0 39 0 0 0
Total 2 383 431 771 0
Table 1
Number of Victims of Padang Earthquake, 2009
Source: Local Disaster Management Board (BPBD, 2009).
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Emergency situation (up to 6 months post earthquake; September 
2009-early 2010). It can be said, in emergency situation, Padang rela-
tively looked chaotic or not well managed. The action of some people 
that tried to take benefit from the hard situations in emergency period 
made the situation got worse. Just hours after the earthquake, people 
found a number of young traders sold mineral water four times than 
the usual price to their fellow Padang survivors. This happened in the 
middle of traffic jams when people were in queue to get to the hills 
to save their selves and their family members. On October 8, the na-
tional newspaper Kompas reported that a glass of mineral that used 
to cost Rp. 500 was sold Rp. 2,000. Cigarettes were sold Rp. 15,000 to 
Rp. 20,000, while it usually cost Rp. 10,000. The price of fuel reached 
about Rp. 20,000 while the regular one used to be Rp. 4,500 to Rp. 
5,000. Some people in the streets even sold it at Rp. 40,000. Cab driv-
er charged up to Rp. 500,000 per route, which is about ten times than 
the ordinary days. Chili price that becomes the main ingredient for 
cooking rose up to Rp. 100,000 per kilogram.1
On the other hand, the local government performance was seen 
to be very slow. Some police officers were not in their office when 
earthquake happened. The head of provincial police office admitted 
that his staffs were busy to save their selves. Some even got back to 
nagari to their family. Due to limited resource, the local government’s 
rescue team was absorbed to save victims in Hotel Ambacang that vic-
tims in other areas, like in Pondok were handled well. Public service 
did not work. Electricity was off for more than a week,2 while water 
supply ceased for about a month.3 In that regards, people relied much 
on external aids. Up to about a week after the earthquake, in Chinese 
kampung, plundering was also found quite frequently. About three 
Chinese informants I interviewed also mentioned that some people 
lost their property, like stoves, gold that was saved in houses that were 
ruined at the time, radiators, some tools and machines for car repara-
tion business, and so forth. Some household utilities, like televisions, 
fridges, and air conditioners, were also lost.4Economy at the time was 
slowing down. In addition to the price rocketing, Padang also experi-
enced goods extinction. Fuel, woods, rice, vegetables, sugar, cooking 
1 See <www.lipsus.kompas.com/grammyawards/read/2009/10/08/04012656/Gempa.
Enggak.Gempa.Cari.Untung.Jalan.Terus> Retrieved on April 20, 2015 at 09:17. 
2 Interview with a Minang electricity contractor on June 2010. 
3 See <http://m.padangmedia.com/1-Berita/57742-Distribusi-PDAM-Pulih-Dalam-Satu-
Bulan.html> Retrieved on April 21, 2015 at 07:43. 
4 See <http://mahakam-news.blogspot.com/2009/10/kampung-pecinan-dijarah-belum-
dapat.html> Retrieved on April 21, 2015 at 07:49. 
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oils, and so forth are amongst the goods that became very expensive. 
Local traditional market also ruined and people could not run their 
trading activity. Dealing with this, Bayu said, 
Not only losing houses, people also lose jobs. The most difficult thing is 
losing hope. The women who have their husband working as tailor in tra-
ditional market felt a great hardship because there was no income for the 
destroyed stalls. The government’s aid is only Bulog rice (the National Lo-
gistic Board’s rice assistance) that is not good to consume. Earthquake is 
the initial death for the real death.5
Padang scenery became very messy. Traffic jams were an everyday 
and every hour phenomenon. Ruined houses in kampung were not yet 
to get managed. Until about 10 months after teh earthquake, when I 
firstly visited Padang for my first research, some messy buildings were 
still not yet cleared up. In this case, NGOs, student volunteers, reli-
gious organizations, humanitarian organizations, and Chinese cultur-
al organizations (kongsi) became the key for tackling the situations. 
They helped the people by providing foods, clothes, medicine, and as-
sistance for cleaning up the ruined buildings. 
First phase of recovery (from 6 months to 1 year post earthquake; 
2010). Entering the first phase of recovery life was still very hard. The 
government assistance had not yet been well organized. City spaces 
were not well managed. Padang looked very messy. Traffic jam got 
worse. Amidst the unmanaged city, people still had to struggle with 
life for the limited assistance from the government, as well as with the 
unmanaged ruined buildings. The cleaning up and reconstruction of 
traditional market, which becomes the center of local economy, was 
very slow, not only because of the ruined shops and roads, but also be-
cause of the bad handling of the dead bodies of the earthquake victims 
within the market. Consequently, the sense of returning to ‘normal’ 
life was also not yet to arise. Up to 1 year post-the earthquake, the 
atmosphere was still within disaster situations. The following impacts 
of this are the slowdown of economic growth. The religious and hu-
manitarian organizations and voluntary activists remained the main 
actors for helping the people dealing with their hardship. Chinese or-
ganization (kongsi) is amongst the most crucial one to help people 
provide basic needs and assistance to reconstruct house buildings. 
Second phase of recovery (1-2 years post earthquake; 2011-2012). 
In this phase, housing reconstruction was started. The government 
5 In the transcript of Perhimpunan Aksara (2010).
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also started to execute its policy of post-disaster reconstruction. As 
an initial execution, the government formed what they called ‘pilot 
project’, in which a village was chosen as an example of the first re-
construction project. People started to busy with forming reconstruc-
tion groups in their neighborhood environment to access to financial 
supports from the government to fix their houses. Yet, the govern-
ment’s focus on reconstructing the city seemed to be lacking. Pasar 
Raya market reconstruction as the center of the city economy had not 
yet been managed well. Traditional market traders opened their stalls 
along the main roads surrounding the market and in front of the mar-
ket gate. This caused severe traffic jam surrounding the city. Public 
transportation’s drivers even enter the market area to pick passengers 
more easily. This worsens the situation in the market. The local econ-
omy that started to rise up on the one hand, seems to leaves an excess 
on the problem of messy city management. 
Third phase of recovery (3-4 years post earthquake; 2013-onwards). 
Entering the third year of post-2009 earthquake, recovery has not yet 
finished. The government still carried out its housing reconstruction 
program. Pasar Raya traditional market reconstruction was still not 
yet fixed. Trading stalls setting get more unorganized creating more 
traffic jams inside the city. Smaller markets in the sub-urban grew 
rapidly. The city still looks very messy. Tanah Kongsi traditional mar-
ket, conversely, recovered very quickly. It turned to be the cleanest 
market, as well as the market that could provide the best quality goods 
in Padang. In Pondok, the development of new and bigger hotels than 
those prior earthquake grows rapidly. Some spots in Pondok become 
new tourism destination area. Nevertheless, the number of ethnic 
Chinese residents slightly decreases. They migrated to other cities, as 
Jambi, Pekanbaru, Jakarta, and Bandung. Yet, they still become the 
core actor of Padang local economy. The sense of returning to ‘normal’ 
has been found in that area. 
POST-DISASTER COMPLEXITIES: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
MINORITY ETHNIC CHINESE 
In addition to messy management of post-disaster situation, Padang 
also experienced some problems in social relations that are also very 
influential to the recovery processes. This includes mainly the issue 
of discrimination against minority Chinese that was seen not only by 
ethnicity different to common Padang residents but also by religious 
beliefs. The issue of discrimination against minority ethnic Chinese 
was blown up after a text message became viral amongst the people. 




Tell the world; stop the donation to West Sumatra!!! Primordialism and 
racism are happening there. Chinese people are not allowed to have food 
and were forced to buy food aid. Family of mine was there!!! Please send 
out this massage to the world so they know the truth!!! 
At first, discrimination against ethnic Chinese in Padang after the Sep-
tember 2009 earthquake was believed to be merely a rumor. However, 
media response to the issue was massive, that it became the public 
concern. A Netherland radio, broadcasted its interview with Rina, a 
female Chinese resident saying that, 
We are safe but our house is severely destroyed. It needs for major recon-
struction because it is not safe anymore to stay within. However, until now 
there is no assistance being allocated. They (the apparatus) evacuated (the 
victims) outside China town surrounding company (and hotels). (Mean-
while) there are many people killed in the (Chinese residential) area, which 
they did not handle. 6
In fact, Rina is not alone. Another Chinese man admitted that there 
was no help distributed to Chinese kampong that the Chinese to take 
of their own selves, although they were clearly bearing the greatest 
impacts of the earthquake.7
From this, it becomes clear that the limited aid is the main rea-
son of the widespread issue of discrimination against ethnic Chinese. 
The aids include the need to rescue the victims in Chinese kampung. 
Secondly, it includes aids for daily survival. Related to the rescuing 
policy, ethnic Chinese saw that rescue team came very late to Pondok 
in spite of the massive impacts of the earthquake, and focused rath-
er on the victims in Ambacang hotel. Based on an interview with a 
Chinese man,8 if only the rescue team could come in Pondok timely, 
the number of death might be less (Alfirdaus, 2010). He added, there 
were still people that could survive until 3 days after the earthquake, 
but finally were died, because they did not get immediate help. He as-
serted, while calling for the rescue team to take action, what ordinary 
people could do is only to throw away foods and drinks in the midst 
of ruining building, hoping the dying people could access to it. In fact, 
the limited number of the rescue team was centered on Ambacang 
hotel, and when they were available for tackling people in Pondok, the 
6 As can be seen at <cdn.radionetherlands.nl/bahasa-indonesia/article/penduduk-
kampung-cina-padang-didiskriminasi> published on September 30, 2009.
7 Metro TV on October 6, 2009.
8 On June 2010, in Padang.
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people already died. Meanwhile, for basic needs aids, people felt that 
the ones distributed to ethnic Chinese were very limited. This includ-
ed the distribution of staple foods and medical facilities in Pondok, of 
which the people were mostly affected. Some of them gained side-dish 
money of Rp. 5,000/day for about a month, but some others did not. 
People understood that stigma that ethnic Chinese was rich played 
very much in this case. Even, the government alleged that Chinese 
were too dependent and spoily, since they were actually already rich 
and did not need for help. 
The ethnic complexities surrounding emergency periods had 
caused the political climate got heated. This issue also heightened 
the existing social tension between Minang and Chinese for years for 
the issues of religious differences. Indeed, Minang people generally 
rejected to be alleged as discriminatory. They said the root of prob-
lem was laid on the slow performance of the local government. A Mi-
nang woman, who is active in an NGO, said the government faced the 
problem of performance, transparency and accountability (Alfirdaus, 
2010). Therefore, it is more about the slow performance of the local 
government than about the ethnic politics issue. She even asserts that 
the issue of discriminations against ethnic Chinese was blown up by 
the media to boost the oplah. The issue was not seen important by 
most Padang residents. To figure highlight more clearly the view, an-
other Minang woman said that disaster is a disaster for lay people, but 
not for the politicians. It is because, when a disaster hits Padang, they 
are the first to access to the aids. An informant argues, instead of tack-
ling the impact of 2009 earthquake, the aid distribution for post-2007 
earthquake had not yet been totally tackled due to the complexities 
in local bureaucracy. Therefore, saying the messy governance of post-
2009 earthquake in spite of the huge amount of money the local gov-
ernment received as a sign of discrimination against ethnic Chinese 
rather than as a portrait of bureaucracy’s performance is questionable 
(Alfirdaus, 2010).
The social complexity in emergency period also arose for the rare 
collective works (gotong royong) amongst neighbors. Instead of help-
ing the victims, people visited the destroyed areas merely for looking 
around. Because of this, the term ‘disaster tourism’ was then popular. 
People near Pondok then related it with the issues of ethnic difference, 
in which not helping the fellow Chinese was something deliberative. 
However, a Minang woman said that acting like this—not directly 
helping the others—is the typicality of Padang residents. Based on 
an interview with this woman, typically Padang residents relied on 
individuals and nuclear family’s assistance during the emergency sit-
uation. She added, it is considered awkward to offer helps to those 
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personally unrecognized.9 That is why collective works like the one 
found in Yogyakarta was not much happened, for each community 
member focused on his or her own family. Moreover, there was sim-
ilar number of non-Chinese residents (Minang, Javanese, Batak, and 
Jambi) that were suffering a lot from disaster impact.
The problem get more complicated because the government of-
ficers rather shown their reactionary statement instead of responsive 
actions. Sudarto, an NGO activist, remembered that Fauzi Bahar, the 
mayor of Padang city, expressing frontally his disappointment towards 
ethnic Chinese. He did so because he felt the government already 
helped the Chinese through evacuating the victims in Ambacang Hotel 
and helping Yayasan Prayoga (Catholic school foundation), which are 
located in Pondok area. In fact, as Sudharto identified, although the 
hotel owner is a Chinese, most of the victims are Minang. As Sudharto 
explains, the real Chinese victims is in Chinese kampong (residential 
areas), and not in the hotel. Unfortunately, those who were trapped 
under the ruined houses in Pondok were mostly left unassisted. As 
a Chinese man argues, should the government act very quickly, the 
number of death toll might be less than what is now listed.10 Dealing 
with Yayasan Prayoga, Sudharto asserts, although Yayasan Prayoga is 
a Catholic-based school, and its students also include Chinese, it is not 
affiliated to Chinese. Therefore, as Sudharto argues, it is awkward to 
claim assisting the Chinese by evacuating people in Ambacang Hotel 
and Yayasan Prayoga schools, while they actually did nothing with the 
people in Chinese kampong.11
What makes the problem looks worse than what it actually hap-
pened is the mayor’s action in Chinese kampong as if he was helping 
the Chinese residents. Elisa, a Chinese student, said, ‘Fauzi Bahar’s 
action is just too much. What for is acting to carry out a sack of rice 
in his back in Pondok and broadcasted by TV station. For me, it is just 
exaggerating. As a matter of fact, there is no crucial follow up after 
this action to assist people in Pondok’.12 Until almost 9 months after 
the earthquake, there were no many Chinese, who could access to the 
government’s aids for staple foods and medical facilities. The Chinese 
mostly gained it from their fellow Chinese and kongsi. 
Dealing with this Veridiana, a Chinese woman, added, ‘I was in-
formed that there is no government’s assistance at all. Once more, 
9 On June 2010, in Padang.
10 Interview on June 25, 2010, in Padang.
11 Interview on June 20, 2010, in Padang.
12 Interview on June 29, 2010, in Padang.
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the government assumes ethnic Chinese will work by their selves to 
get everything done’.13 Veridiana clarifies that Chinese would clearly 
do by their selves, but this does not mean they do not need for help. 
A Chinese shop owner strengthened Veridiana said that ‘Chinese de-
serve the government aid because they are also citizen, and the pay for 
taxes even more expensive than the other citizens’.14 Another Chinese 
shop keeper said that there was already a government officer that vis-
ited her to collect data from her. However, she never knew what the 
government did next responding to data collection. After 10 months, 
there had been no aids distributed to Chinese residents. Dealing with 
this, Bayu, a Minang man, added, 
The condition in Pecinan (Chinese kampong) is severe, especially because 
there are many Pondok residents that have not gain any help, as they are 
coined to be already rich enough. (Fortunately), they have a cultural or-
ganization called HBT (Himpunan Bersatu Teguh). Many Chinese that 
wound and trapped in the collapsed houses are left unassisted. And, this 
has been a sensitive issue, here (in Padang). 15
Strengthening Bayu, Mohd Nur, a male Moslem Chinese juice sell-
er, said that the government assumes Chinese is already rich. This 
makes the government insensitive towards the complexities in Chi-
nese environment.16 As Mohd Nur, there are thousands Chinese res-
idents that need for helps. While Mohd Nur sells fruit juice in cart, 
his neighbor sells cold sugar crane juice.17 Mohd Nur clarifies the 
point that not all Chinese is rich, and there are many of them who 
live in poverty, and as many other people in the world, also there is 
a problem between the rich and the poor Chinese in terms of social 
relations. Confirming Mohd Nur, Albert, a Chinese man, said that 
the social life of Chinese is like the life of many other Indonesians. 
Some of them are rich, but there many of them that are poor.18 Albert 
exemplifies, there are Chinese who worked as a parking guard, street 
newspaper seller, and house maids. There are many poor Chinese 
that did not have any ability to reconstruct their ruined houses after 
they cleared it up. 
13 Interview on June 25, 2010, in Padang.
14 Interview on June 21, 2010, in Padang.
15 Transcrip of Perhimpunan Aksara, 2010.
16 Interview on June 26, 2010, in Padang.
17 An estimation of income for juice sellers is Rp. 20,000 - 50,000 (US$ 1.8 - 3.5) a day.
18 Interview on November 20, 2013, in Padang.
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Interview with a Minang woman reveals that what Mohd Nur 
and Albert’s concerns happen in society. The woman confirms that 
there was no aid being distributed in Chinese kampong. However, she 
added that, 
[…] the ethnic Chinese is already covered with insurance. They are covered 
with big insurance. Therefore, when the earthquake hit Padang, they could 
move around (leaving Padang and then come back again when Padang is 
already safe). Once they come back, they quickly could rebuild (their shops 
and houses). They all live in Pondok and there is no one that lives in kam-
pong (with Minang residents). There are few of them that live in Cendana 
area, which is a real estate. They are different. Chinese has distance with 
Minang. They could not do anything in Padang. If they were asked for 
charity, they used to protest. They are not sincere. They are not accepted to 
live in kampong. They have a lot of money. Their insurance is big.19
She added, in terms of insurance Chinese is not like Minang. She ad-
mits that she does not have any insurance that will cover her risks. 
She said, 
Our salary is just right. We, who work in the government office, remain 
unable to speak up. If we were critical, we will lose opportunity to advance 
our careers. Moreover, we are heading to direct governor election. This 
applies to post-disaster policy as we now are facing. We could just receive 
what the government would like to give. If the government gives the aids, 
we appreciate it. If not, we could just accept it.20
The interview with this Minang woman reveals that the stigma about 
ethnic Chinese as being rich is not nonsense. It exists in society. 
Nonetheless, not all people agree with the opinion that the so-
cial issue that arose during the emergency period is mainly about dis-
crimination against ethnic Chinese. Those people rather see that the 
post-disaster complexities are about the usual bureaucratic problem.21 
This view is commonly rose up by Minang residents, who feel that 
those who suffer from the absence of aids are not only Chinese; it 
included Minang as well. Erniwati, a Minang woman, admitted there 
were crucial problems in post-disaster recovery. However, she refuses 
if this is mentioned as a form of discrimination. She rather sees this 
19 Interview on June 29, 2010, in Padang.
20 Interview on June 29, 2010, in Padang. 
21 As Febrin and Erniwati said in an interview on June 25 and 26, 2010, in Padang.
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as the typical pathology of local government.22 Confirming Erniwati, 
Ratna, a Minang woman, said that she experienced the very slow re-
sponse of the government. She asserted, ‘If only the government were 
quick in spreading the aid, we might be able to recover soon. We need 
almost 6 months to smile again. The first three months was still very 
scary. Things get slowly better just afterwards. Currently, Padang is 
more managed. Previously, it is just like a dead city.23
Ratna clarifies it is not easy to access to the aids from the govern-
ment. She knew there were many financial aids from the outside in-
stitutions. However, aid distribution in Padang is never an easy issue. 
There is problem in government management, including the aspect of 
data collection and follow-up policy. She explains, 
We are not brave enough to protest (the government). We could only sub-
mit required documents. This is because our leader is not transparent. 
They also did not good data collection. There are things that are miss-man-
aged. We can look at the death victims in Pasar Raya traditional market. 
They said they already gathered the data. In fact, several days afterwards, 
there were still dead bodies found within the building of the market, in-
cluding bones and skeleton. Now, Pasar Raya area is divided into smaller 
stalls from plywood. Instead of getting good, this makes the market mess-
ier than it was in previous time. The provided stalls do not cover all the 
traders. Meanwhile, if the traders want to open stall along the sidewalk, 
the government always prohibits it. The government asks the traders to 
trade in stalls, but the number of stalls is limited. The stalls also close the 
access to the traders inside the market. Everything is messed-up. Instead 
of managing post-2009 earthquake, the government does not yet even get 
post-earthquake reconstruction done.24
Moreover, as she said, ‘ethnic Chinese is mean, not kind and not sin-
cere. They are exclusive. They are not Moslem. They will never be 
accepted in kampong. If they were praying, they used their offering, 
which is smelly. People in kampong cannot stand with the smell, so 
they are forced to leave kampong’.25 What she tries to underline is, 
instead of Chinese—that is new comers and minority, Minang—that 
is coined as the native and majority of Padang residents—are not that 
easy to access to the government’s aids. 
22 In an interview on June 27, 2010, in Padang. 
23 Interview on June 29, 2013, in Padang. 
24 Interview on June29, in Padang.
25 Interview on 29 June 29, 2010, in Padang.
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Given such a condition, it is understandable should community 
collective work was rare during emergency and recovery periods in 
Padang. Mohd Nur clarifies his fellow Chinese that people looked not 
to care of one another. Chinese, especially, could only help their own 
selves, instead of hoping the others to help them, although they clearly 
needed for the help. Being Indonesian Chinese and minority ethnic, 
for Mohd Nur, is a cause of why Chinese rarely got assisted. Arifin 
Salim, confirming Mohd Nur, asserts that in his opinion the absence 
of collective works to assist ethnic Chinese seems merely to have rela-
tionship with the fact that Pondok residents are mostly Chinese.26 Re-
ligion, including Islam that is embraced by few Chinese seems not to 
have significant influence to the way Chinese is seen. Ethnic Chinese 
remained being looked as if they are rich, and had wider network to 
overcome the disaster impacts, and, thus, did not need for help from 
outside. Therefore, confirming Salim, it is not a surprise that in the 
2009 earthquake, inter-community collective works in Padang did not 
happen to rise. 
KALIURANG
POST-DISASTER SITUATIONS 
The most threatening natural disaster in Kaliurang is Merapi volcano 
eruption, which is predicted to occur at least once every four years. 
Merapi volcano is located in the middle of Central Java and Yogya-
karta Provinces’ borders, crossing four districts in the two provinces 
(Magelang, Klaten and Boyolali in Central Java and Sleman in Yogya-
karta). Its eruptions are noted to happen in 1872, 1994, 2006, 2010, 
2012, and 2013. Amongst the periods, 2010 eruption is the biggest with 
the significant number of loss in society. The 2010 eruption occurred 
on October 26 and 27 and on November 6, with the death toll of 353, 
and around 400,000 people in both Yogyakarta and Central Java Prov-
inces were moved out from their residential areas. Its pre-eruption 
activity had been started since September 2010, and its post-eruption 
volcanic activity remained until the late November 2010. Less inten-
sive Spiro plastic floods followed until several months afterwards. 
In the emergency and early recovery periods, the role of NGO and 
humanitarian organizations is crucial, in addition to the role of the 
local government. People also relied on their neighbors. The helps of 
those less affected to those who were more affected by the eruption 
that mostly had nothing to leave in their homes, except the land that 
26 Interview on 25 June 25, 2010, in Padang.
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turned to be unproductive, were very useful during survival periods in 
shelters.27 Some other helps also came from other institutions like the 
churches, the mosques, universities, and so forth. However, in order 
to return to ‘normal’ life, namely to reactivate farming and cattle pro-
duction, people relied much on the government. Around 300 acre of 
farming areas destroyed due to the volcano ashes,28 and almost 2,000 
cows were dead due to the burning fire post the eruption.29 All of these 
aids helped people pursue their initiatives in rebuilding their houses, 
agriculture and public facilities. A more detailed explanations on the 
situation of post-disaster from emergency phase until recovery phases 
based on field research conducted on December 2013 and January 
2014 are presented below. 
Emergency (up to 3 months post-the eruption; October-Decem-
ber 2010). In Kaliurang, at the phase of emergency, neighbors played 
crucial roles, in addition to family, in helping people to survive. Ac-
tions by neighbors were usually spontaneous and unorganized. The 
role of the government was crucial, but not optimal.30 Siren was being 
turned on by the government did not reach wide areas surrounding 
the volcano. Some informants admitted, they even knew about the 
eruption from television broadcast. The facilities being provided by 
the government to transport people to temporary shelters were not 
enough. This is one of the explanations of why people looked not well 
prepared during emergency periods. Yet, the roles of neighbors com-
plemented the roles of the local government. Some people said that 
their local leaders and some youth organizations in their villages were 
very helpful. They made coordination with private company and mil-
itary officers to provide cars and trucks to transport the people out 
of the villages.31 The other young men in dusun (sub-villages) coop-
erated with their fellow neighbors that owned cars or motorcycles to 
carry out women, the elderly, and children from their homes to the 
safer places.32 There were also some others who offered space in their 
vehicles spontaneously to those who fled their homes.33 Temporary 
27 To get the land back to its normal, the people need at least three-four years post the 
eruption. 
28 See <www.politikindonesia.com/index.php?ctn=1&k=nusantara&i=20622> Retrieved 
on February 24, 2014. 
29 Source <peternakan.litbang.deptan.go.id> Retrieved on February 24, 2014. 
30 Concluded from several interviews during December 2013 and January 2014, in 
Kaliurang.
31 Interview with Ahmad Syarif on January 8, 2014 in Kaliurang.
32 Interview with Sutarno on December 22, 2013, in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta.
33 Interview with Ny. Sulistiyo on January 2, 2014, in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta.
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shelters were the main destination of most people. For months peo-
ple stay at shelters provided either by the local government in sport 
stadium, school building and hunian sementara (temporary house), 
by university at their buildings, or by the nearby church. They visit-
ed their villages only to make sure their remaining living cattle were 
sufficiently fed. 
First phase of recovery (up to a year after eruption; 2010-2011). 
As described earlier, during the first months of post-Merapi eruption, 
most of Kaliurang residents stayed at shelters, either provided by the 
government, religious organizations (like Islamic boarding schools 
and churches), and universities. Sport stadiums, village offices, uni-
versity buildings, boarding schools’ rooms, and churches’ building 
were amongst the places to stay. Sometime, they had limited water 
supply and bad public toilets. In some other places, they were treated 
well with enough foods and decent sleeping rooms being provided. 
It can be said i this phase people were still reliant on the helps of 
the others because people were still unable to return to their burnt 
houses, nor earn income to run their daily life. Those, who had their 
houses partly destroyed, were busy to clean them up from the volcano 
ashes or to fix the destroyed parts. Gotong royong (collective works) 
was still rare in this phase because people were focusing on their 
own family and houses to get cleaned.34 After cleaning and fixing their 
houses, they used to come back to shelters. Meanwhile, those, who 
had their houses totally destroyed and were no longer able to stay 
within, were forced to remain staying at the shelters until reconstruc-
tion aid was distributed, which was a year later. 
While staying at temporary shelters, they also tried to earn mon-
ey by being ojek driver (motorcycle drivers) and small-scale traders. 
Those, who still wanted to continue their farming, had to mobile 
from their shelters to the garden near their original houses, and then 
came back when the day was heading to afternoon. Despite of tech-
nical difficulties, people did not cease their efforts. They realized that 
at this phase, having a permanent occupation was a crucial issue. 
Therefore, for those, who were unable to cultivate land, being an ojek 
driver is a possible option. Although they usually earned Rp. 40,000 - 
50,000 (US$ 3.5 - 4.5) a day, which is far below their daily income as 
a regular farmer and cattle producer, they kept this choice until they 
could return to their own houses.35 For those, who had their houses 
less destroyed could leave the shelters and start a ‘normal’ life, as well 
as run their new business generally after three or four months. Those, 
34 Interview with Sarah on January 8, 2014 in Kaliurang.
35 Interview with Ramijo on October 12, 2013, in Kaliurang.
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who had their houses fully destroyed usually, could return after one 
to two years. 
Second phase of recovery (1 to 2 years after eruption; 2011-2012). 
In the transition period between the first and second year of post-erup-
tion, resettlement policy by the local government was executed. Focus 
was mostly given on those who had their houses totally destroyed, 
their farming land totally burnt, and their cattle were totally dead. 
The local government combined the policy of reconstruction and re-
location. Reconstruction was for those that had their settlement was 
partly destroyed. Relocation was for those who had their land was 
no longer possible to live in due to the high risk of volcano eruption. 
People in the shelters started to be relocated in the new areas with 
the assistance mainly from the local government. Some community 
members that rejected to be relocated and rather chose to stay at their 
own land were threatened not to be given any assistance by the gov-
ernment. This indeed triggered big protests. The government, how-
ever, insisted not to make any negotiation unless the community was 
willing to be relocated. The very high risk of the location to Merapi 
eruption was the main consideration of the government. Meanwhile, 
those who insist to stay argue that they already have their earning 
source in that area (farming). They did not see they could do so in 
new location. Some other people, who similarly live in the most risky 
area, made a strategy to propose bedhol desa relocation (relocating all 
the village members in one place in order not to significantly change 
the neighborhood structure) to the government.36 The others just ac-
cepted what the government set up for them. In this phase, social or-
ganizations, which were mainly meant to be the media of social con-
solidation for responding recovery policy in the village level, started 
to be active again. 
With the relatively quick response from the government, enter-
ing the second year post-the eruption, most people already returned 
to their own homes or new houses in the relocation area. After get-
ting settled, people started to reorganize their selves through reac-
tivating RT organization (Rukun Tangga or neighborhood organiza-
tion), dusun (sub-village government), and desa (village government). 
Monthly meeting was started to be reactivated in order to re-order 
social activities. In addition to individual activity in the respective 
households, people also conducted activity in community level. Activ-
ities in community level were particularly aimed at fixing public facil-
ities as bridge, public road, mosques, meetinghouses, and so forth. In 
relocation area, people also started to learn about community waste 
36 Interview with Ramijo on October 12, 2013, in Kaliurang
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management. The role of NGO, in addition to the role of the local 
government, was crucial for providing technical and organizational 
trainings of waste management.37 Gradually, people started to recover. 
Third phase of recovery (starting in the third year post eruption; 
2013-onwards). Entering the third year of the recovery period seems 
that life started to be ‘normal’. For those, who live in relocation area, 
challenges generally come from the obligation to change habit with-
in new social environment. Previously, they used to live in their own 
house that was large and a bit separated from their neighbors, which 
let them enjoy ‘personal freedom’, like to turn their television aloud. 
Now, they had to adjust with their new small houses and their closest 
neighbors, who sometime have their infants crying, and make their 
environment a bit noisy.38 Nonetheless, they feel that now they are 
more organized. Some women also started to get used with collec-
tive home-industry activities sponsored by the district government. 
In this phase, people also seemed to get accustomed with their new 
professions in tourism sector either as jeep drivers, ojek drivers, tour-
ist guides, and warung (small shop) owners. They admitted that life is 
surely more difficult.39
POST-DISASTER COMPLEXITIES: RELIGIOUS AND TRADITION 
DIFFERENCES
It is known that Merapi Volcano eruption in 2010 in Kaliurang is 
amongst the worst eruption ever identified with relatively high death 
toll and the severe level of destruction. However, going more deeply 
into society, the problems in fact are not merely about those tangi-
ble things. One of the issues that ever heat the social climate in Kali-
urang and Yogyakarta in general is related to religion. This problem 
strengthens the existing problem due to bureaucratic constraints in 
disaster management during the emergency and recovery phases. Al-
though Kaliurang community in the surface looks homogeneous with 
most of the population are ethnically Javanese and Islam believers, 
in fact problems dealing with social issues like religious differences 
and traditional beliefs are quite strong. Firstly, it deals with the issue 
of evangelization. Secondly, it is about the social tension between old 
and young generation, especially relating to the practices of tradition 
and rituals. Below is the description of the problems one by one. 
Evangelization (or in local language is used to be mentioned 
as Christianization) has been a contentious issue in Kaliurang long 
37 Interview with Sumarni on October 13, 2013, in Kaliurang
38 Interview with Sumarni on October 13, 2013, in Kaliurang.
39 Interview with Ramijo on October 12, 2013, in Kaliurang.
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before the 2010 eruption.40 The issue strengthened when the church 
situated in the safe zone nearby Kaliurang, a Christian university, 
namely Duta Wacana Christian University (Universitas Kristen Duta 
Wacana—UKDW) and the other Christian organizations provided 
shelters, staple foods, medicine, and clothing for Merapi survivors.41 
The issue was firstly blown up by the Yogyakarta’s hard-liner Moslems 
by alleging the Churches and the other Christian organizations trying 
to persuade the evacuees to convert to Christianity with some material 
compensation. Those, who got evacuated in the Church, were being 
intimidated and forced to leave the Church. Because of this, situation 
during the first days of emergency phase was very stressing. 
Responding to this, some respondents argue that the allegation 
of Christianization is not true. Some evacuees in UKDW, for instance, 
admitted that the university provided better place for temporary 
stay.42 The room was comfort living, the toilet was clean, water supply 
was sufficient, medical needs were well provided, and students were 
available there for assisting the Merapi eruption survivors.43 Similarly, 
those who stayed at the Banteng Christian church admitted that the 
place was decent enough to live, at least compared to the sport stadi-
um in Meguwa, the neighboring sub-district of Pakem and Cangkrin-
gan, provided by the government. However, what is more important 
is, those respondents acknowledge that in these places, they were free 
to conduct prayers five 5 times, as a Moslem usually practices. They 
were allowed to use water for wudlu (cleaning the body with water be-
fore praying) and room for praying. Dealing with this, Nyonya Sulis-
tiyo, a Merapi eruption survivor that was evacuated at Duta Wacana 
Christian University, said, 
(After looking for decent shelter) At the last, we stayed at Duta Wacana 
(Christian University), (of which direction is) Bethesda Hospital to the 
south. We were in group. I stayed there for almost a month, and I got sick, 
afterwards. (In those periods) I also got some aids from Duta Wacana. It 
consisted of cooking oil, rice, bread, and so forth. While staying there, I, as 
a Moslem, was free to conduct shalat (5 times prayers in Islam). Those who 
want to pray in the mosque or in the church were fine. Even, a colleague 
40 As Ahmad Syarief said in the interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
41 As said in interview with Isparmi on January 2, 2014, in Kalirang; with Mbah 
Gito on January 2, 2014, in Kaliurang; and with Ny. Sulistiyo on January 2, 2014, in 
Kaliurang.
42 As Budi Susanto said in the interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
43 Interview with Budi Susanto on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
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gave me a praying cloth because I did not bring anyone. Alhamdulillah... 
(Praise to Allah).44
Another experience is shared by Mrs. Marwan. She said, ‘I stayed at, 
what is called? (Asking her female fellow, who was cutting collecting 
grass in front of her), Banteng Baru. It is Banteng Baru Church. In the 
Church, we used to use the room for shalat’.45 Responding to the ac-
tion of Moslem hardliners forcing those staying at the Church to leave, 
Marwan added, ‘It is awkward to say if we were forced or persuaded 
to convert to Catholics. How could people tempt us to embrace Cath-
olics while at the same time they provided us a room for shalat in the 
Church during our stay there?46
Although Nyonya Sulistiyo and Mrs. Marwan assert that Chris-
tianization during evacuation is merely a rumor, it had triggered so-
cial tension in Yogyakarta. In Central Java this was even responded 
quite strongly Indonesian Ulama Assembly (MUI—Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia Jawa Tengah).47 Some media mentioned the allegation of 
Christianization did not only happen in Yogyakarta, but also in Munti-
lan (Magelang district), Boyolali and Klaten (in Catholic Church Ke-
bunarum) in Central Java Province that were also affected by Merapi 
eruption.48 Not only created tension between Moslem and Christian 
believers, the issue of Christianization also triggered tension amongst 
Moslem leaders. Moderate Moslem leaders from Nahdlatul Ulama or-
ganization, like Abdullah Muhaimin and Said Agil Siraj, as hardline Is-
lam media alleged, were said to allow Christianization happened, just 
because they visited the Merapi survivors regularly in the churches to 
make sure that they were comfortbale enough to stay.49 Meanwhile, 
it is clear that, based on Muhaimin’s experience in Catholic Church 
Ganjuran, Bantulan, the issue of Christianization is non-sense.50 In 
44 Interview on Janury 22, 2014, in Kaliurang.
45 Interview on 8 January 2014, in Kaliurang.
46 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
47 Republika 2010 ‘Astaghfirullah, Pengungsi Merapi Dikristenisasi [Forgive us Allah! 
Merapi Evacuees were Christianized]’ December 29.
48 Voa-Islam (online news), 15 November 2010, ‘Ribuan Pengungsi Merapi Ditampung 
di Gereja, Akidah Terancam Dimurtadkan [Thousands of Evacuees were Collected in the 
Chruches, the Faith is Threatened to be Converted].’
49 Eramuslim (online news) 2010 ‘Kristenisasi Korban Bencana Merapi Didukung 
Petinggi NU [The Christianization of Merapi Evacuees was Supported by NU—a 
Moderate Moslem Organization in Indonesia]’ December 6.
50 Kompas 2011 ‘KH Abdul Muhaimin: Merangkai Keberagaman [KH Abdul 
Muhaimin: Crafting Pluralism]’, January 13. 
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order to cooling down the situation, Muhaimin cooperating with a 
Catholic priest made an agenda to visit the churches day-to-day to 
lead the prayer and preach to the evacuees. 
Another tension is also present between the young and old gen-
eration, especially relating to the practices of rituals that rooted in 
Javanese tradition in daily social life. This includes, for instance, the 
practices of nyadran and selametan. Nyadran is an activity prior and 
during Ramadhan (fasting month in Islam) to send the dead family 
prayers, but it is usually also followed with offerings and food dis-
tribution. Meanwhile, selametan is (anytime) ritual to seek for God’s 
blessings, either as an expression of grateful feelings to God or as a 
praying to God’s grant for savior. Wuriyanti said, 
Tension between the old generation and the young one remains to exist. 
You know, it is a difficult issue. (The old men) often persuade the young 
men to attend kenduri (selametan). If the members of the community are 
ten, they want those ten people attending. Although those ten young people 
are silently rejecting the invitation, they at last fulfill it just to respect to the 
old one. Therefore, they actually attend with different niat (intension). The 
young men (who used to be educated in Muhammadiyah waythat rejects 
kenduri) believe that in their religion, kenduri is not compulsory. It is the 
social life that makes it compulsory. Meanwhile, there are many kenduri 
here. There are four during Ramadhan (not to mention the other months). 
Yesterday, we just attended kenduri for commemorating (newborn) cow.51
In the context of recovery phases, the religious activities as kenduri 
or selametan are inseparable from the daily life of Kaliurang commu-
nity, to pray for those being killed by the eruption, as well as to ask 
for grace and savior for those who are still granted life by God during 
the hard periods of the eruption. In Kaliurang (and Javanese society 
in general), both nyadran and selametan require the participation of 
a number of people, therefore the rituals are collective in the nature. 
The root of problem between young and old generation’s relations 
stems from the different perception about the practices of nyadran, 
kenduri and selametan. The old generation feels that it is still very im-
portant, while the young one feel that it is not relevant to the people’s 
needs. First, it takes a lot of money—and off course, time. Second, it 
is close to syirik (betraying God) because it uses particular materi-
als that are identical with Javanese religion, like flowers and offering 
foods. However, sometime the young generation could not resist the 
51 Interview on October 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
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old one. As a result, although such a tension is not yet cleared up, the 
practices are still preserved until today. 
Indeed, many other problems influence the way the communi-
ty members build their social relations one another. However, so far, 
those problems, namely Moslem-Christian relation, majority and mi-
nority Moslem, and old and young generation’s relation—are amongst 
the prominent ones in Kaliurang community dealing with religion 
and cultural practices. From this, it becomes clear that even in society 
that seems to be homogeneous, problems remain exist. These prob-
lems are outside the issue of physical destruction, but remain influen-
tial in the way people dealing with disasters. Therefore, considering 
these issues in disaster management is as important as handling the 
problems of physical reconstruction. 
ISSUE WITHIN ISSUE: DIVERSITY WITHIN POST-DISASTER 
SITUATIONS 
The rise of the issue of diversity in the context of post-disaster situa-
tions as Padang and Kaliurang communities experience has shown us 
its impact on the doubling burdens for community to recover. Diver-
sity itself is not a problem, unless someone makes it as a problem so 
that it omits the rights of those called as ‘the others’. Moreover, when 
diversity is problematized during the context of disaster, it will surely 
worsen the situations that have already been hard due to post-disaster 
destruction and lost. In the context of Padang, for instance, ethnic 
Chinese that comprised the most victims in 2009 earthquake have 
been pressed by the problems of destroyed buildings, public facili-
ties, and inflation. People were in high need for assistance. However, 
just because they are Chinese, which are identified as being rich—but 
unfortunately also stigmatized as being mean and greedy at the same 
time—their rights to gain assistance in emergency periods were ne-
glected. They could only access to aids in reconstruction phases after 
a series of media pressure and political lobby were imposed to the 
local government. 
Meanwhile, it is clear that not all Chinese in Padang are rich. 
There are many of them that do not pursue their education into uni-
versity after high school. There are also many of them who work as 
laborer, instead of entrepreneurs, a profession that is perceived iden-
tical with ethnic Chinese. If so, there are a lot of them who run only a 
small of shop (warung) that will help them to survive in the daily life. 
It is also not difficult to find out Chinese women that work as house-
maids in their kampung in Pondok. These poor people of course are 
in strong need of help when disaster hit. Unfortunately, these facts are 
not seen by those who are trapped in ethnic sentiment. Sitgma works 
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better than facts. Whatever it is, ethnic Chinese remains being seen as 
the one mostly contributing to the non-Muslim statistics in Padang, 
in spite of the increasing number of Chinese conversion to Muslim. 
They are also as the most important competitor for Minang to develop 
their economy. 
Purdey (2002) identifies that ethnic sentiment addressed to ethnic 
Chinese, which seems to persist until currently, cannot be separated 
from the issue of nationalism and political economy. Ethnic Chinese 
is identified to be in the side of the colonial government during the 
colonial era. When Indonesia was busy with anti-communism under 
the support of the United States during New Order, ethnic Chinese 
was made to be the target of cleansing for being identical with the 
People Republic of China (PRC) that is communist in ideology. Their 
success in economy has been made to be an issue to provoke violence 
against ethnic Chinese prior reformasi era in 1998. Some ministers 
at the time asserted that ethnic Chinese domination had caused eco-
nomic crisis in Indonesia, although it is clear that the state’s inability 
to manage and develop economy due to huge corruption of Soeharto’s 
family and crony played the most portion for Indonesian economic 
failure. Based on Purdey’s argument, from the experience of ethnic 
Chinese in Padang, it becomes clear that Cheesiness is not a problem. 
It is problematized because there are politics, blown up either by the 
state or non-state actors, behind, so that it looks that being Chinese 
is a problem. In disaster context, the problematization of Cheesiness 
bears impacts on the omission of ethnic Chinese’s rights as a citizen 
to access to government aids for rescuing their families and fulfilling 
their basic needs.
Similarly, there is nothing wrong when the Churches and a Chris-
tian university offering help to Merapi eruption survivors in Kaliurang. 
Just because they are affiliated to Christianity, and the survivors are 
mostly Muslim, the offer then is perceived as problem. A participant 
of a discussion in my presentation session in a seminar asserts that 
there seems to be a lag in the idea of ‘service’ in Christianity that is not 
well understood by those committed church sweeping, although the 
politics of number across religion is also not a trivial problem. Suspi-
cion that the survivors would be persuaded to convert to Christianity 
has motivated the Muslim hardliners to force the survivors to leave the 
churches. The same is found in terms of different perception about tra-
dition, although happens in relatively soft and non-frontal modes. The 
young people believe that tradition is merely about status quo—of the 
old generation, while for them practicality is more important. For old 
generation, the young men are just like to rebel because of their young 
blood. Understanding is the only one that connects these differences. 
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From the above-written explanation, it clarifies us that diversity 
is an unavoidable social fact for society. Yet, it is not a social problem. 
It becomes a problem when people play it as political commodity and 
fail or do not have willingness to govern it. Referring to Reilly (2006: 
11-13), diversity becomes political because it is constructed so. Reilly 
mentions the politicization of religion and ethnicity is one of the most 
common phenomena that contribute to the political sense of diversi-
ty, as commonly in Asia and Pacific, like in the issue of Islamic fun-
damentalism in Indonesia and Muslim conflict in Southern Thailand 
that involves Thai and Malay ethnic groups. Dealing with this, what 
should be counted more is then not the diversity per se—how many 
ethnic groups, religious beliefs, and racial groups comprise a commu-
nity—but more importantly is how it is governed. In this case, Reilly 
(2006: 21-22) concerns on political engineering that he defines as, ‘the 
conscious design of political institutions to achieve certain specified 
objectives’. In this regard, I took different start from that of Reilly. 
While Reilly concerns his ideas of political engineering on the for-
mal institutions, i.e. on electoral system, in this research I focus more 
on how community ‘engineers’ their diversity governance using their 
daily cultural practices. As such, what I mean by ‘engineering’ in this 
case is not in the formal sense, but in informal, as I have addressed 
earlier. The discussion of community diversity governance in post-di-





GOVERNING DIVERSITY WITHIN: 
COMMUNITY CULTURAL PRACTICES  
AND DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW 
This chapter discusses cultural practices in community diversity gov-
ernance, especially in the context of post-disaster situations. This re-
veals community initiatives across the cultural (and somehow reli-
gious) beliefs and backgrounds to deal with the problems of social 
relations during the periods of emergency and recovery in Padang 
post-2009 earthquake and in Kaliurang post-2010 Merapi eruption, 
as the previous chapter has addressed. In Padang, the use of cultural 
practice on community diversity governance is traced from the idea 
of raso pareso, while in Kaliurang it is from the idea of serawung, 
sengkuyung and gotong royong. Further, this chapter discusses the use 
of cultural practices in community diversity governance and its con-
tribution to the promotion of democracy from below. Some challeng-
ing issues in this case are also discussed, because it is realized that the 
practice is not always going very easily. 
CULTURAL PRACTICES AND GRASSROOTS DIVERSITY 
GOVERNANCE: RASO PARESO IN PADANG AND SERAWUNG, 
SENGKUYUNG AND GOTONG ROYONG IN KALIURANG
Before further discussing how cultural practices as manifested in 
the idea of raso pareso in Padang and serawung, sengkuyung and got-
ongroyong in Kaliurang it is important to discuss their meaning for 
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communities. The meaning underlined in this part is identified from 
literature review and interviews with local communities during the 
fieldworks. Although there is not yet a consensus amongst scholars 
about what exactly these ideas mean, the identification of the mean-
ings at least will be helpful for understanding further discussions of 
the building of democracy from below through the governing of diver-
sity issues in communities. 
THE MEANINGS FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Literally, raso means feel. Pareso is the same with the Indonesian 
word, namely periksa, which means to check or to clarify. Referring to 
Nusyirwan (2011), raso pareso (in Bahasa is rasa-periksa) is a balance 
between feel and rationality, in which feel needs to be checked with ra-
tionality, that it will sound logic, evidence-based, and having long term 
orientation. And, conversely, rationality should be checked with the 
feeling that it will sound context-sensitive and is able to avoid hurting 
others. In raso pareso an individual should support his/her argument 
with sufficient evidence, as well as listening carefully when the others 
delivering their views in decision-making (Yulika, 2012: 165). 
Referring to Latief (2002: 65), Minang culture identifies the ap-
plication of raso pareso thatincludes two main principles, namely the 
principle of raso dibao naik and of pareso dibao turun. Raso dibao 
naik literally means lifting what is laid on the heart (feeling) up to the 
brain (rationaility). Pareso dibao turun means lifting what is laid on 
the brain (rationality) down to the heart (feeling). Ratio examines the 
feeling. Equally, feeling examines the ratio. Therefore, as Erniwati ex-
plains, it is not a surprise should community dialogue (musyawarah) 
in kampong, nagari, village, and so forth, could last very long, because 
people consider carefully what others talk about. Although the com-
munity members get equal freedom to deliver their aspiration, they 
also have obligation to listen to the others.1
In wider Minang context, raso pareso is closely linked to the idea 
of alam takambang jadi guru, which literally means, ‘the nature that 
develops to be the teacher for the people’. This emphasizes the need 
to be sensitive to the social and natural environment that always gives 
signs and a source for learning. In the application of raso pareso and 
alam takambang jadi guru some ethical teachings have been described, 
which culminates in the concept of modesty (sahaja; sederhana). Mod-
esty is broken down into the following values, in which:
1 In an interview, November 18, 2013, in Padang.
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1. The strong ones are prohibited to commit to war; 
2. The rich ones are not allowed to ask for help and;
3. The poor ones are not necessary to feel undermined. 
In addition to this, there is also the idea of ‘kato nan ampek’, which 
means the four-word rule that asserts social adjustability in social 
environment. ‘Kato nan ampek’ consists of four words of ‘mendaki’, 
‘menurun’, ‘mendatar’, and ‘melereng’. ‘Mendaki’ (to step up) is to 
speak and behave politely to the olders. ‘Menurun’ (to step down) is to 
speak with love to the younger. ‘Mendatar’ (to step ahead) is to respect 
those that are equal in age or in social status. ‘Melereng’ (to step like 
getting along the roads in the mountain) is to speak implicitly, like to 
daughter/son’s mother/father-in-law. Amongst the four, ‘melereng’ is 
the most popular, as can be seen in Minang pepatahpetitih (proverbs) 
for being considered the most polite way to communicate. Pepatah pe-
titih (all sorts of proverbs) is seen important to represent raso pareso, 
because it is very close to the idea of modesty. Through pepatah-petitih 
a person will not be too much in expressing the feeling of anger—and 
of course happiness—to avoid physical dispute when two parties are 
disagreeing or jealousy when sharing good news. 
While raso pareso deals with modesty in personal and social life, 
serawung, sengkuyung and gotongroyong in Kaliurang mostly deal with 
social environment. Literally, serawung means to socialize with the 
other community members in order to unite with the community in 
the nearby environment. Blending with the other neighbors in ronda 
(community safety guard) and social gathering is something common 
to find. Serawung is a clear representation of what Tönnies (2001) con-
ceptualizes as gemeinschaft, in which collectiveness could also be the 
objective of the social activity, instead of merely as the means. Being 
selfish is not an option in community, and people are obliged to be 
care of the others. Serawung is seen important in Java because people 
believe that they could not live without their neighbors. They believe 
in the nature of interdependency of human beings. Ramijo, the dukuh 
head in Kaliurang said that social unity that is built through serawung 
is needed to manage and solve social hardship.2 Therefore, having 
good social relations is a requirement to have good mutual helps. 
Sengkuyung is understood as a way to embrace the other com-
munity members, who are in difficulties, in order to lift up their bur-
dens (to care of), to give them necessary helps (to share), and to in-
clude them in social activities (to engage). Sengkuyung for Javanese 
2 Interview on October 12, 2013, in Kaliurang.
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community is an expression of welcoming and open-minded way 
of thinking. Individualism is something avoided in society. Ahmad 
Syarief, a new comer and a student of an Islamic Boarding school in 
Kaliurang said, ‘So, we apply a term called as sengkuyung in society 
when we participate in community collective works. It is similar to 
lift up one another’s burden. We are new comers here. It would be im-
polite if we do not want to (participate in social life). In Javanese (he 
repeats again), it is termed as serawung’.3 Strengthening this, Maman 
said, ‘(If there is hajatan—similar to selametan), it is just the same. 
We visit each other. It is applicable to funeral, death commemora-
tion, and marriage. No problem. In Eid Al-Adha, all the community 
members are given (meat). It is just usual, people getting involved in 
dusun to meet and chat. It is not a new thing. People get used with 
sengkuyung’.4 Sarah describes sengkuyung by giving an example as the 
below statement: 
During Christmas, our Moslem neighbors also participate in safety guard-
ing. Similarly, when Moslem neighbors celebrate Eid Al-fithr, the Christian 
fellows also join in safety guarding surrounding Kaliurang. So, we share 
the social tasks.5 In Eid Al-adha, Christian neighbors are also there (in the 
mosque). The meat is distributed evenly.6 If we hear one of our neighbors 
dead, we also visit them. If the dead neighbor is Christian, the Christian fel-
low is responsible for handling (the funeral). Our Moslem neighbors also 
come to express their gratitude, but they do not participate in handling 
the matters. They only handle the commemoration of the fellow Moslems. 
However, the Moslem neighbors accompany us until in the cemetery.7
Finally, gotong royong means collective works that is identical with 
mutual help and cooperation. The difference of sengkuyung and got-
ong royong is, in sengkuyung the purpose of the inclusion of the com-
munity members in taking care of the others’ burdens or problems is 
more individual, while in gotong royong, the purpose tends to be more 
collective. In gotong royong, what the community use to collectively 
handle includes building, fixing, and maintaining public facilities. The 
nature of sengkuyung usually is accidental, while gotong royong is usu-
ally scheduled periodically, may it be weekly, monthly, and so forth. 
3 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
4 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
5 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
6 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
7 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
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People, however, in practice do not strictly differentiate the term. 
Sometime they mix it. What is more important is the essence of help-
ing the others. Serawung, sengkuyung and gotong royong reflect what 
Geertz (1957: 32) underlines when discussing Javanese society that 
Javanese society, ‘emphasizes the manner in which belief and partic-
ularly ritual reinforce the traditional social ties between individuals’.
CULTURAL PRACTICES IN GRASSROOTS DIVERSITY GOVERNANCE 
As underlined in the preceding chapter, ethnic Minang and ethnic Chi-
nese relationship in Padang has long been in a distance. Differences in 
ethnicity and religion are mentioned to be the main causes. However, 
as Purdey (2002) argues, differences in ethnicity and religion are only 
happened in the surface. Sometime, these cultural attributes are only 
politicisized like through the wide spreading of stigmas and label-
ing to mobilize ethnicity or religious sentiments of the crowd to gain 
some political benefits. If we trace further, in the context of Padang 
the contrasting political views since the colonial era, as well as long-
lived economic competition between ethnic Minang that is counted 
as pribumi (native residents) and ethnic Chinese as pendatang (new 
comers) significantly explains the problems. Besides, during the emer-
gency and early recovery periods, ethnic and religious sentiment was 
lifted up again causing the aggravating tension between ethnic Mi-
nang and ethnic Chinese. 
Interestingly, although the issue of discrimination against ethnic 
Chinese post-2009 earthquake was strong, it fails to expand to be a 
violent social conflict. This is surely helpful for the next processes of 
recovery. Dealing with this, some people relate this with the economic 
interdependency between ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese (look for 
instance Erniwati, 2007, 2011). In my interview, Erniwati also says 
that Minang feels ruining Chinese will mean ruing their own econ-
omy. Small shop owners in Minang community have been very de-
pendent to ethnic Chinese’s supply and distribution in machineries 
and the similar goods gained from outer cities. Similarly, ethnic Chi-
nese is also dependent on ethnic Minang in supplying local farming 
products.8 Therefore, when the issue of discrimination against ethnic 
Chinese in Padang arose, both Minang and Chinese tried not take it 
seriously in their daily relationship. However, if economy is the only 
explanation, why did people in Medan do not do so? When entering 
political transition in 1998, unlike Padang, Medan was firing due to 
violence against ethnic Chinese, although clearly ethnic Chinese and 
8 Interview on November 23, 2013 in Padang.
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the native residents of Medan have similarly interdependent econom-
ic relations. 
Dealing with this, looking at Minang daily cultural practices 
might be helpful in addition to some explanations from economic 
perspective. In that regard, focusing on raso pareso becomes very cru-
cial. Some informants—from ethnic Minang and Chinese, affirm that 
raso pareso have helped people to function their self-control. Based on 
interviews, there are at least three strategies both the ethnic groups 
were taking, figuring out how the idea of raso pareso is manifested in 
diversity management in daily practices. The strategies include the 
following. 
The first is to admit the problem (limited aids and slow response 
to the earthquake victims and survivors), but not to exaggerate the 
cause that is generally mentioned (discrimination against ethnic Chi-
nese). Based on my interview with Erniwati, instead of denying, eth-
nic Minang generally admits that there is a big constraint of aid dis-
tribution during emergency and early recovery phases. However, they 
generally pointed out bureaucracy as the main cause of slow emergen-
cy response, rather than discrimination. In order to strengthen their 
view, they also asserted that in addition to ethnic Chinese, they, who 
are actually native residents in Padang, are also part of those experi-
encing the difficulties.9
Although it looks simple, this response is strategic. It sounds less 
reluctant to respond the problems of aids distribution, but remains 
being careful to allege the cause (discrimination). As such, they share 
their recognition with ethnic Chinese, but, by pointing out something 
else other than discrimination, they reject that discrimination exists. 
This is quite different with the other ethnic groups in Indonesia in 
general that tend to act very primordialistic when negative allegation 
is attributed to them, although politicization may take a role in it. 
Some interethnic violence in Indonesia is known to have partly a 
root in such a thing. Dayak-Madurese conflict in Kalimantan and Poso 
conflict in North Sulawesi, for instance, happened because of this 
ethnic and religious sentiment. Through such a response, we can see 
quite clearly how raso pareso is working. By admitting the problems, 
Minang has shown us that they try to feel what ethnic Chinese feels—
getting refused, excluded and marginalized in aids distribution. But, 
by pointing out another thing other than discrimination as a cause, 
Minang has shown us their awareness of social and, possibly, politi-
cal consequence of this to their fellow ethnic Minang, like the rise of 
9 Interview on November 23, 2013, in Padang.
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negative stigma about Minang, as well as the worsening relationship 
of Minang citizen with the local government that is also comprised 
mostly by ethnic Minang. 
The second is to conduct a meeting with prominent figures. Re-
sponding to the widespread issue of discrimination against minority 
ethnic Chinese, prominent figures from both ethnic groups tried to 
meet one another for clarification. Ethnic Chinese was represented 
by the prominent kongsi leaders from HTT and HBT. They met with 
Padang mayor, representing either the local government or Minang 
community. Although the meeting involved Padang city mayor, the 
meeting ran in a informal way, conducted in mayor’s own house and 
outside working hours. In the meeting, the participants agreed not 
to prolong the problem, and chose rather to focus more on rehabil-
itation. The meeting, of course, is criticized to be very political. It is 
because; it is ethnic Chinese that was required to apologize for the 
spreading rumors of discrimination against them, instead of the other 
way around. Ethnic Chinese in this instance clearly remained hard to 
sit equally with Minang as Padang citizen. 
Interestingly, instead of resisting the demand, they agreed to do 
so, as Erniwati explained.10 Although this impresses us that ethnic 
Chinese then looks weak before ethnic Minang and Padang local gov-
ernment, this actually part of political tactic, which in De Carteu’s 
term is contrasted with strategy. Referring to De Carteu, tactic is a way 
of the object of power to take advantage amongst the difficult situa-
tions imposed by the power holders. Meanwhile, strategy is a way of 
the subject of power to create and retain status quo in economic and 
political relations. As such, tactic is a bit opportunistic. In the case of 
ethnic Chinese and ethnic Minang meeting, this tactic is read well. 
Therefore, although this might sound unfair, this actually reflects eth-
nic Chinese’s political awareness. 
As a result, this has successfully ceased the social tension to con-
tinue, and ethnic Chinese was later listed as the recipients of the re-
construction aids as the other Padang residents. For the houses that 
were destroyed, the government distributed about Rp. 15 millions/
household. For those who have their houses modestly destroyed, the 
government provided about Rp. 10 millions/household. In addition, 
for those who had their houses lightly destroyed, the government pro-
vided Rp. 1 million.11 Indeed, meeting with Padang city mayor is not 
10 Interview on June 27, 2010 in Padang.
11 See <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/161597/bantuan-rekonstruksi-rumah-
rusak-berat-rp15-juta-jauh-dari-cukup> Retrieved on April 21, 2015 at 09:05. 
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the only one. In several occasions, Padang city mayor also tried to 
visit Pondok during recovery periods. In addition, ethnic Chinese and 
ethnic Minang also conducted some informal meetings with promi-
nent figures of nagari—traditional community unit in Minang society 
to cooling down the situations. In this case, nagari salapan suku, of 
which office is situated in Pondok, plays crucial role in succeeding the 
meetings. 
The third is to make a concrete contribution in recovery process-
es. When people were stuck during the emergency periods for the ab-
sence of the government aids (in early 2010), it is Chinese organiza-
tions (e.g. HTT and HBT)12 that helped them survive, in addition to 
some other aids distributed by company, donors, NGOs, and other hu-
manitarian organizations. Through their kongsi organization, Chinese 
collected aids from their fellow Chinese throughout Indonesia, and 
even foreign countries. Albert, a central figure of one of the Chinese 
organizations, said, his organization allocated some amount of money 
to help non-Chinese residents. The total amount is about one fourth 
of the total charity Albert had collected. The non-Chinese receivers 
included Javanese, Batak, Jambi, and so forth. The other three fourth 
was used to help the members of his organizations reconstruct their 
houses and reactivate their businesses. This was based on the man-
date of the donators.13 A Minang male trader in Pasar Tanah Kongsi 
confirms Albert by saying, 
Yes, there was aid distributed by HTT, HBT. Minang community members 
also gained some. There is no difference between Chinese and Minang. 
Both Chinese and Minang are given a package of aid. There are also aids 
from the Church in which Moslem victims of earthquake could also gain it. 
In Tanah Kongsi, all the traders and residents gain aids from HTT. There 
is no difference at all.14
Another crucial contribution of Chinese in Padang is in terms of the 
renovation of Tanah Kongsi traditional market, Goan Hoat traditional 
market and Gantiang Grand Mosque. The renovation is a result of the 
significant contribution of a Chinese businessperson, namely Ferryan-
to Gani, who is also known as the leader of HTT.15
12 HBT is Himpunan Bersatu Teguh. HTT is Himpunan Tjinta Teman. Both are a kind 
of cultural organizations. 
13 Interview on November 20, 2013, in Padang.
14 Interview on November 21, 2013, in Padang.




For HTT’s big contribution, nagari leader of which territorial area 
is in Pondok granted Ferryanto Gani adat (traditional) title, which lat-
er triggers a controversy. By those who disagree with nagari salapan 
suku’s policy, the entitlement is seen to make adat title granting looks 
like a great sale. Meanwhile, for the nagari leader said that it is part 
of the gratitude of Minang community to Ferryanto for his big con-
tribution to develop Padang. A person I met in the nagari office said 
that what ethnic Chinese did for helping ethnic Minang, not only in 
Padang, but also in the other regions of West Sumatra, has been great. 
For him, it will look too arrogant if ethnic Minang refuses to thank 
to what ethnic Chinese has been doing. Moreover, the relationship 
with ethnic Chinese will not last as long as they still reside in Padang. 
Therefore, for him, maintaining good relationships will always be cru-
cial to keep peace and social harmony. 
Apart from the political sense of ethnic Chinese and ethnic Mi-
nang’s meetings, as well as ethnic Chinese’s action to help people in 
Padang and West Sumatra, and nagari salapan suku’s entitlement to 
ethnic Chinese’s prominent leader, this has shown us of both ethnic 
groups’ awareness of what should be doing in responding to the prob-
lems. Ethnic Minang chose to share their awareness of the problem of 
aid distribution, but pointing out bureaucracy instead of discrimina-
tion against ethnic Chinese as the cause of problem. Similarly, ethnic 
Chinese chose to initiate the meetings and agreed with what requested 
to them—to apologize, to cease further clash with ethnic Minang, as 
well as to take part in aid distribution in Padang and West Sumatra. 
This kind of practices reflect quite clearly what Minang means by raso 
pareso, namely to consider what the others’ thinking and feeling of 
particular problems, in order to avoid direct friction, and maintain 
social harmony.  
A rather different strategy is practiced in Kaliurang, in which peo-
ple, as previously argued, characterized by their strong collectiveness 
in social relations. Therefore, in responding social problems like the 
allegation of Christianization and social tension due to different per-
ception about adat (tradition), people tend to choose resolution that 
enables them to remain maintaining social harmony, which is man-
ifested in the practice of serawung, sengkuyung, and gotong royong. 
As Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Gad-
jah Mada University, has reported in 2011, amidst the strong social 
solidarity between communities and social organizations, including 
religious organizations in post-Merapi eruption 2010, there is still 
some clashes caused by religious issue in the evacuation area. A group 
of people entered the churches, where some Merapi survivors were 
evacuated, and forced them to leave the churches. Unfortunately, in 
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this case police and military officers were seen unable to manage the 
tension. Instead of encouraging the parties to meet and talk, the police 
and military officers chose to instruct the survivors to leave the church-
es. This is of course a saddening phenomenon for the community. 
Yet, this kind of event was responded quite differently by the 
Merapi survivors, as well as by some moderate Muslim leaders. Some 
survivors remained staying at the churches until they were ready to 
return to their homes, while some moderate Muslim leaders gave 
their supports to this humanitarian action by building dialogues 
with related parties. Meanwhile, in the case of social friction due to 
different perception about adat (tradition), people chose not involve 
the informal mechanism to resolve. They use their mechanism of ser-
awung, sengkuyung, and gotong royong to cool down the situation, 
and to maintain social relations remain conducive. Below parts dis-
cusses a more detailed pictures of how serawung, sengkuyung, and 
gotong royong are practiced in community diversity management in 
their daily life. 
The first is to take the problem as if it is not a serious thing. Peo-
ple actually know that sweeping the churches when they were evacu-
ated is a serious problem. It is a kind of religious violation. There is no 
right of any religious group to ban another particular religious group 
to offer help during emergency and recovery periods. It is awkward to 
force Muslim survivors of Merapi eruption to receive only aids from 
Islamic organizations. First, people are not certain whether aids from 
Muslim organizations are enough to help them survive. Second, when 
people started to recover and return to their homes, there were many 
religious organizations, not only Islam, that stayed at Merapi (Kali-
urang) to help the survivors. The question is, why not banning Muslim 
organizations to help Merapi residents that are non-Muslim, because 
it is clear that not all residents are Muslim. Community knows exactly 
that humanitarian action should not be limited by religious belief. 
Dealing with this, community, however, chose to regard the prob-
lem as if it is not a serious problem. Isparmi makes the statement 
clearer by asserting that, ‘In evacuation, people do did not really take 
into account the issue of religion. Religion is not a big deal. The most 
important thing is people got place to stay for a while. I am serious. 
Many people were evacuated in the Islamic University of Indonesia 
(UII, in Kaliurang Street). Many of them also stayed at some church-
es, like in Banteng. They were all mixed. There is no rule that says only 
Christian allowed to stay at the churches and Islam at the mosques or 
Islamic universities’.16
16 Interview on January 2, 2014, in Kaliurang. 
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Marwan that stayed at a church when being evacuated asserts 
that, ‘There was nothing happened (during evacuation). So, why 
should be bothered? Even, if you find any problem, you can talk (di-
rembug; rembugan in Marwan’s term.’ In order to give evidence of her 
statement, Marwan told her story about praying when she was stay-
ing at the churches, ‘We were not constrained to pray, to take wudhu 
and shalat (five times praying in Islam)’.17 Budi Susanto explains that 
Kaliurang people were treated well in the churches and Christian uni-
versity. Besides being facilitated to conduct shalat, the churches also 
provided staple, water supply and health facilities.18 Responding to 
this, Sulistyo, a Muslim resident of Kaliurang asserts that, ‘We’re all 
God’s creature. The fellow Christians are also God’s creature. We are 
the same. Therefore, helping each other is encouraged. All is God’s 
creature. Allah’s Almighty’. She does not feel different as the God’s 
creature from that of Christians by being Muslim.19
The second is to ask some prominent moderate Muslim and 
Christian/Catholic figures to take part in interreligious problem reso-
lution in post-disaster context. In this case, the role of Kyai Abdullah 
Muhaimin, a leading figure in Islamic Boarding School ‘Nurul Um-
mahat’, is significant. When I met him in an interview in May 2012, 
he said after the sweeping issue arose, he tried to visit the churches 
where people were evacuated, one by one almost every evening. In 
total, there were 13 churches, which provided shelters for Merapi sur-
vivors, and the location of each church is quite far. In each church, 
he led the evacuees in shalat maghrib (becoming imam for evening 
prayer) and conducted a short qur’anic study (pengajian). He asserts 
there was no refusal from the churches to the evacuees that wanted 
to pray, and the allegation of Christianization is just non-sense. His 
activity to visit the churches one by one is to let society know that 
Christianization is merely a groundless fear. He adds that the Chris-
tianization issue had made life more difficult provide that the survi-
vors had been burdened with the impacts of Merapi eruption. People 
also became more stressful. 
Not only visiting the churches one by one, Kyai Muhaimin was 
also very active in building communication with the priests in the 
churches. Kyai Muhaimin is known to have a close relations with 
Romo Yatno (Priest Yoseph Suyatno Hadiatmojo, Pr), a pastor in a 
Catholic Church, in Somohitan, Girikerto, Turi, Sleman, which is 
17 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang. 
18 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
19 Interview on January 2, 2014, in Kaliurang. 
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quite close to Kaliurang area. These two figures are an active leader in 
FPUB (Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman—Interfaith Brotherhood 
Forum).20 While Romo Yatno was active in mobilizing volunteers to 
help evacuees fulfill their basic needs in the churches, Kyai Muhaim-
in was active in peace campaign during evacuation periods. His rela-
tively good relationship with several key figures in Muslim hardliner 
organization is also useful to build communication with them. Their 
action is not always easy to get handled, but that connection could be 
a crucial path for further communication. 
As a follow-up of this interreligious communication, Kyai Mu-
haimin and Romo Yatno also cooperated in helping Merapi communi-
ty to build water pipe to support water supply and to plant some trees 
involving children from different religious backgrounds surrounding 
Boyong River area in Kaliurang to support reforestation. The involve-
ment of religious leaders like Kyai Muhaimin and Romo Yatno is 
clearly helpful for the community to get through the hard times in 
evacuation periods. 
The third is to remain involving community from different reli-
gious beliefs in collective recovery processes after returning to their 
homes. This strategy was done in internal environment of the commu-
nity. Community in Kaliurang realizes that no matter what, Christian-
ization remains a sensitive issue. Therefore, in addition to the involve-
ment of religious leaders in interreligious peace campaign, in their 
internal environment the community also tried to keep the situation 
conducive by building good relationship with their neighbors after 
their returning to their homes. They realized that not all Kaliurang 
community is Muslim. There are some of them, although minority, 
that is Christians (Protestants and Catholics). The issue of Christian-
ization during emergency and early recovery periods surely made 
them feels uncomfortable with their neighbors, who are Christians. 
In order to maintain their good relations with their neighbors 
from different religious beliefs, upon their return to their homes, the 
community conducted collective works regardless of the community’s 
religious belief. After the community members finished cleaning their 
respective houses from volcano dust, the chief of neighborhood envi-
ronment (Ketua RT) usually coordinated his neighbors to have meet-
ings to discuss collective works. On the weekend, he also coordinated 
community to clean and rebuild public facilities. This may include 
cleaning the roads from growing grasses and bushes, rebuilding the 
20 See <http://romoyatno.info/mainmessage.php?entry=entry100727-122856> Retrieved 
on April 21, 2015 at 12:01. 
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destroyed roads, mosques, and bridges, as well as reactivated commu-
nity collective sport activities, like jogging. 
When a family member of a neighbor gets sick or died communi-
ty in the surrounding environment then quickly comes to share their 
sympathy. They also help the neighbors prepare for commemoration 
for their dead family members, although they do not get involved in 
the religious rituals. When Muslims commemorate Eidil Fithr and Ei-
dil Adha, Christian neighbors are busy helping to manage motorcycles 
and cars parking in the mosque. Similarly, when Christians commem-
orate Christmas, Muslim neighbors help them manage security and 
parking. From these activities, people develop again their social bond-
ings. In addition to helping community build good relationship with 
their neighbors, such interreligious activities also help community to 
build mutual understanding, as well as social resilience for dealing 
with interreligious complexities as they had faced during evacuation 
periods. Otherwise, they will also get easily provoked with a rumor 
that may ruin their social relationship. 
Finally, responding to intergenerational differences on practicing 
adat like nyadran (to give offering to the dead family members) in 
cemetery prior Ramadhan (fasting month), tahlil (praying the dead 
family members in houses or mosques), and yasinan, the young gener-
ally choose to remain obey what the older generation advising. While 
the older generation practices these for respecting cultural and reli-
gious values, in addition to building social bondings amongst neigh-
bors, the young generation usually practices it for the sake of respect-
ing the older generation. This also happened when the community 
had to deal with the burying of dead family members due to Merapi 
eruption. They generally avoid having direct clashes and disputes with 
older generation, although for them it is a bit complicated. 
From the above written-explanation, we can see how the prac-
tice of serawung (maintaining social harmony), sengkuyung (mutu-
al helps), and gotongroyong (collective works) are very strong in the 
context of Kaliurang community. The asertion of rembugan (to have 
dialogue with neighbors) as Marwan highlights, responding to the 
Christianization allegation complexity, shows us her concern on the 
importance of serawung. This is similar to Kyai Muhaimin and Romo 
Yatno activism in building communication exchange and cooperation 
responding to the pressure from Islam hardliner supporters. This re-
flects their belief in the primacy of serawung in dealing with social 
relations complexities. 
Further, the community’s willingness to help their neighbors 
that have difficulties in recovery processes as practiced in road build-
ing clearly reflects mutual sharing, as asserted in sengkuyung and 
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gotongroyong. Some activities are conducted directly to cooling the 
heated situation after the rise of the Christianization issue, as well as 
the disputes on traditions in recovery periods. Some others are con-
ducted to build the resilience of the community in dealing with issues 
like interreligious differences. 
CULTURAL PRACTICES AND DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW 
From the above-written explanation, it can be seen that cultural prac-
tices either as found in Padang or Kaliurang diversity governance are 
in line with democracy principles, namely participation, equality, and 
deliberation, and therefore, can be said to support the development 
of democracy from below. In principles, raso pareso is very accom-
modative to community deliberation and dialogues, while serawung, 
sengkuyung and gotongroyong are also close to community mutual 
sharing, mutual help and mutual understanding. Below parts discuss-
es how and why the cultural practices as discussed above intersect 
with democracy principles. 
Firstly, what is interesting in the cultural practices and communi-
ty diversity governance that is being linked with the promotion of de-
mocracy from below according to Padang and Kaliurang communities 
experience is, it raises in the middle of the absence of the state (and its 
formal democracy). In the case of Padang, it is very clear that the state 
is reluctant to resolve the problems. There is no clear response offered 
by the state to overcome it, for instance to provide spaces for ethnic 
Chinese to voice what they experienced during emergency phases. In 
several occasions, the state, represented by the city mayor, even as-
serted that ethnic Chinese, basically, did not need for help for already 
being rich, which clearly underpins the existing negative stigma on 
ethnic Chinese. Ironically, this seems to be done just to deny the dis-
crimination alleged to his institutions. Of course, such an action is not 
contributive to the bettering of diversity management. Instead of being 
part of solution, the state rather acts as part of the problem. 
It is admitted that the city mayor had shown his willingness to 
meet with ethnic Chinese leader. However, it should have been known 
that the mayor could not be said to represent the state because in fact 
he did not issue any (formal) policy that is supposed to support truth 
seeking in that matter. The mayor did not encourage the local police 
to investigate the root of the issue, for instance, from short message 
being spread in Padang and the world wide, as well as media news 
publishing on discrimination. His willingness to invite ethnic Chinese 
leaders is no more than the politics to force ethnic Chinese to disre-
gard the fact that discrimination against minority ethnic Chinese in 
aid distribution exists. 
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Similarly, when the allegation of Christianization arose during 
evacuation periods in Kaliurang, there is no clear resolution offered 
by the state to deal with the issue. Evacuation, basically, is the state’s 
responsibility. Moreover, it is quite ironic when the state apparatus 
instructed the evacuees to leave the churches just using the reason 
that the evacuees needed to avoiding public suspicion. In that case, 
we can see very clearly the irony in the state’s response. While the 
state was still unsure about to will overcome with evacuation problem 
given the limited facilities and resources the state (local government) 
had, it had discouraged a non-for-profit-and-for-politics institution 
like the churches that voluntarily provided the services. Instead of 
‘feeding’ the hardliners supporters by instructing the evacuees to leave 
the churches, it might be better for the state to manage the issue so as 
much that it does not muddle through the evacuation processes. This 
is part of fulfilling the state’s responsibility. 
Of course, by asserting the absence of the state as the political 
context of the rise of the practices of community diversity governance 
both in Padang and in Kaliurang, this does not mean to explicitly con-
trasting the idea of the informal democracy and formal democracy 
imposed by the state. However, it is not rare to happen that commu-
nity initiatives to promote democracy from below that is generally 
informal in the nature is motivated by the fact that formal democracy 
does not work properly. Referring to Kaufman and Alfonso (1998: 1), 
based on Latin America experience, the idea of democracy from below 
rises because people aspire to search for forms of democracy that will 
allow them to control their lives and livelihood. When the provided 
institutions supposed to pursue democracy principles do not work as 
they are supposedly functioned, community will surely find a way as 
an alternative. 
Secondly, both cultural practices as found in Padang and Kali-
urang communities look to enabling the work of deliberation process-
es in communities. Raso pareso, for instance, has encouraged com-
munity members from ethnic Chinese to have a dialogue with some 
prominent figures from ethnic Minang. It might be running not in an 
entirely equal way, because ethnic Chinese is still treated as minority 
that is (informally) obliged to be the subordinate of ethnic Minang in 
decision-making, but it has at least expanded the spaces and oppor-
tunity to have a talk with fellow neighbors. Further, in the context of 
Padang, raso pareso has also encouraged people to control of what 
they talk about and what they do in order to prevent community mem-
bers from different ethnicity and religious backgrounds from direct 
clashes. With the cultural practice like this, community from different 
backgrounds may live peacefully, but remain unable to be strongly 
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engaged one another. Ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese are so far 
noted to be very rarely involved in violent conflicts, but they also noted 
not to have strong engagement to particular extent. 
This is quite different from what happens in Kaliurang. Serawung 
in Kaliurang, for instance, has not only encouraged community to get 
engaged one another in a relatively equal mode, it has also enabled 
them to build communication and cooperation across religion. This 
is supported with the practices of sengkuyung and gotong royong that 
underline mutual sharing and understanding in daily community life. 
Some might argue that in such a practice there is possibility that com-
munity do participate for the sake of groupthink. Lunenburg (2010: 
2) defines groupthink as the groups’ decision-making that prioritizes 
groups’ consensus instead of realistic consideration based on political 
and economic evaluation. Therefore, in groupthink, the groups’ cohe-
siveness outweighs any other thing. Therefore, if we compare again 
with what we call as democracy principles, this tendency is actually 
deteriorating (the democracy principles). In the context of Kaliurang, 
this might be happened to some extent. It has been known that Ka-
liurang community, as Javanese, do value much good social relation-
ships. However, as argued earlier, in addition to serawung, sengkuyung, 
and gotong royong, community still has what they call as rembugan. In 
that mechanism, people are allowed to have an opportunity to speak 
what they are thinking. Through rembugan, community may propose 
some excuses for particular things they are unable to undertake. The 
fact that Padang is comprised by two different ethnic groups and Ka-
liurang is relatively homogenous might explain this. 
What might also be important to note, there are, however, still 
some parts of these cultural practices that are not optimally contribu-
tive to the development of democracy from below. Raso pareso across 
ethnic and religious groups in Padang, for instance, is still operating 
in a minimalist mode, namely to control the potential of violence. Al-
though it has encouraged interethnic dialogues, it is still very political. 
Interethnic relation is still framed with majority-minority perspective 
than with an equal idea.
In the context of Padang willingness across ethnic groups to have 
dialogues, however, is a kind of progress. During New Order, such 
kind of thing would not happen. Provided the New Order government 
finding discrimination allegation spread widely and publicly, there 
must be the state apparatus that sanction ethnic Chinese very hard-
ly. Thanks to reformasi era in 1998. Nevertheless, reciprocity that is 
built through raso pareso should not also be undermined. It has con-
tributed much to the building of ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese’s 
resilience to ethnic sentiment provocation. The fact that the issue of 
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discrimination against ethnic Chinese did not escalate to wider violent 
conflict is found to have strong relations with the sense of reciprocity 
both ethnic groups have built. This repeated the same experience in 
reformasi 1998, in which Padang is amongst the few cities that did 
not experience mass violence against Chinese in Indonesia, although 
problems related the two ethnic groups are not simple. Although this 
might be minimalist, the absence of violence is surely not a simple 
progress. 
Conversely, in the practices of serawung, sengkuyung, and goyong 
royong in Kaliurang, participation and equality is not a crucial issue. 
Community has accustomed with collective works and mutual shar-
ing. Differences in religious beliefs and perceptions about tradition 
do not lead the community members to subordinate each other. How-
ever, this may incur the risk that the community becomes not critical 
to their inner social and political structure. Meanwhile, there might 
be some members of the community that are benefitted from formal 
decision-making in village level for having close relations to village 
government head and officers. In recovery process, for instance, there 
might be some community members that could access to aids earlier 
(and easier and more) than the other community members. Besides 
getting not critical, hesitancy may also explain the situation. In spite 
of hesitancy that may obscure community’s criticism towards unfair 
decision-making in villages, consciousness towards equality amongst 
community members remain critical in developing democracy from 
below. This should not be undermined. 
LINKING DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW WITH FURTHER 
DEMOCRATIZATION AGENDA: SOME WAYS FORWARD
Apart from some shortcomings entailed, community cultural practic-
es as found in Padang and Kaliurang, consisting of raso pareso and 
serawung, sengkuyung, gotongroyong, and rembugan, remain becom-
ing crucial seeds for building democracy from below. Deliberation 
they try to underline, participation they assert and equality they pro-
mote are in line with the basic principles of democracy. However, the 
crucial issue in this matter is not only about the use of these cultural 
practices in the enhancement of democracy from below, which in this 
case is done through grassroots diversity governance, but also about 
the promotion of these practices in wider democratization agenda, let 
say in the state level. 
Of course, this must not be an easy task. Politics in the state lev-
el is much more complex and contentious. There is also challenge 
from status quo that is benefitted from the existing political system, 
and does not prefer reform, because it clearly treats their well-beings 
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(Beckman, 2005: 168). In addition, community in the grassroots also 
often, ‘do not have ready-made means to change either their lot in life 
or the societies in which they live. They do not have access to effective 
means of political power. They do not have access to sufficient means 
of economic production. They do not have the education, the training, 
or, in many cases, the self-esteem and self-confidence to engage in a 
successful process of change [...] In some cases any attempt by these 
individuals and groups of individuals to bring about change is met 
with harsh repression’ (Kaufman, 1997: 5). All of these constraint, al-
though sound overwhelming, have reminded us about the challenges 
to promote wider democratization agenda using democracy from be-
low practices as a seed. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that pushing democratization 
from below is impossible. There have been some experiences in some 
countries that show us the facts that grassroots democracy can be 
of power to enrich democracy in the state level. Participatory gover-
nance in Brazil, expanding deliberative forums in China, and the wide 
spreading grassroots democracy in India are a clear example of this 
(Cornwall, 2008: 1). In Brazil’s participatory budgeting, community is 
engaged in decisions over priorities for public expenditure investment 
(p. 14). In India’s expanded grassroots democracy, quota and reserved 
seats help much because they enhance opportunity of those previous-
ly excluded from politics to enter the governing arena (p. 15). Both are 
not happened suddenly from above. There is a long history of the com-
munity’s politics in below level to push the system in the above level 
to be accommodative to community’s aspiration and their contexts. 
Dealing with this, the experiences of Padang and Kaliurang com-
munities have shown us that Indonesians, basically, have had the in-
gredient to promote democracy from below level. By regulation, there 
is also an already existing requirement for policy makers to take into 
account public participation in designing policy and development 
planning. The problem that constrains this to happen is the area of 
formal decision-making is often co-opted by elite (politicians), which 
tend to orient policy for their oligarchy circle, and technocrats (bu-
reaucrats), who claim to master the technicality of policy implemen-
tation and evaluation. Given the facts that the communities already 
have ingredient, and regulations have supported to do so, the chal-
lenge is then about to make community involvement in decision-mak-
ing is more than a rule, rather as a concrete practice. In Cornwall’s 
term (2008: 33), it is called as institutionalizing participation. 
Dealing with this, making the efforts of connecting democracy 
from below with wider democratization agenda as realistic as pos-
sible is important. The first strategy to institutionalize community 
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participation is by involving the mediating and mobilizer actors, like 
NGOs (Cornwall, 2008: 35). Although NGOs involvement in Indone-
sian governance is not free from critiques, like being donor-oriented 
and has crucial problems in terms of human resources, in some cas-
es, it has helped community to be counted more in decision-making. 
The involvement of WALHI, an environment NGO in Indonesia, in 
the case of mining conflict in Pati, Central Java, for instance, has en-
couraged decision makers in the Province to listen more to the indig-
enous community’s aspiration to postpone the cement factory. This 
also works quite effectively in the case of iron sand mining in Kebu-
men, Central Java, in which some local NGOs have contributed much 
to the enhancing of community’s knowledge, awareness, network and 
confidence in pushing the local government to postpone its extractive 
policy planning. 
Secondly, the mobilization of social media might be the effective 
way to encourage some changes in policymaking. The wide use of so-
cial, however, has raised politicians’ awareness of the importance to 
remain being popular and acceptable by public. Some crucial issues 
in Indonesian decision-making have been successfully ceased after a 
series of protest were addressed because the policy looks to disadvan-
tage public. The case of Budi Gunawan appointment as the Indone-
sian police chief recently is a clear example. Budi Gunawan is known 
to be a not-clean figure in police office. He is also identified to have 
close relations with the center of oligarchy circle in Jakarta. Public 
was afraid that if the President continues his policy to appoint Budi 
Gunawan, the future of corruption eradication will be in a big ques-
tion. Given the fact that currently social media is only accessible to 
those living in urban areas and by those from middle class societies, 
expanding its use might be very helpful. 
Of course, there are many things that can be done to encourage 
the promotion of democracy from below level. However, so far, it 
seems that these two strategies that are currently feasible. Firstly, in 
almost all regions in Indonesia, some local NGOs already concern on 
politics and local decision-making. Secondly, the use of social media 
in Indonesia is now getting wide and wide. Mobilizing what commu-
nity have had and is possibly to having is a realistic way to promote 
further democratization from below level. 
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION
The practices of democracy in Indonesia that counts more ballot box-
es than the real voices of community have widely been the object of 
criticisms. Disconnectedness between democracy conducted in elec-
tions periods and in daily governing practices have rose the scholars 
and practitioners’ attention on democracy from below, which is also 
called grassroots democracy and informal democracy. They believe, 
while formal democracy, or in another occasions is called state-led/
promoted democracy or democracy from above, has not yet resulted 
in the pursuance of substantive elements of democracy, enhancing de-
mocracy from below might be an alternate route for democratization. 
Interestingly, this research found that in the two areas the widespread 
practices of democracy from below arose because of the absence of 
the state in interfering issues of diversity that need for the state’s re-
sponse. In Padang the case relates to discrimination against minority 
ethnic Chinese in aid distribution. In Kaliurang, the problems relate 
to the allegation for Christianization in aid distribution and inter-
generational friction due to tradition during recovery processes. This 
research portrays the experiences of Padang and Kaliurang commu-
nities in using their cultural practices to harness grassroots diversity 
management as identified above in the context of post disaster situa-
tion to be a seed for promoting democracy from below. 
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From the discussion in the previous chapters, it can be seen that 
Padang and Kaliurang community’s experience of post-the 2010 Mer-
api volcano eruption and 2009 earthquake recovery highlights some 
crucial lessons of grassroots diversity governance. Raso pareso and 
inter-ethnic solidarity, as well as serawung (to socialize to enhance 
community engagement), sengkuyung (mutual sharing and mutual 
helps to assist neighbors) gotong royong (collective work) and rem-
bugan (community dialogue), are amongst the cultural practices that 
are crucial in maintaining community peace, in addition to tolerance 
and volunteerism that are useful for recovery phases. Culturally and 
locally based practices as such have let the mechanism of community 
collaboration as well as conflict resolution in disaster recovery work. 
The use of community cultural practices in grassroots diversity 
governance in the context of post-disaster situations in fact has con-
tributed much to the development of democracy from below. Raso 
pareso has been very crucial in allowing both ethnic Minang and eth-
nic Chinese to practice community deliberation. This is manifested 
from the willingness of ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese to meet 
and talk about the wide spreading issue of discrimination against eth-
nic Chinese in post-disaster aid distribution. Although the dialogue 
has not yet totally erased the gap between ethnic Minang that acts as 
majority and ethnic Chinese as the minority (new comers), it has wid-
ened the opportunity for the two ethnic groups to agree each other to 
cease the tension caused by the issue. 
Similarly, serawung, sengkuyung, gotongroyong and rembugan in 
Kaliurang have been seen to contribute to the strengthening of mutual 
understanding, mutual sharing, mutual help, tolerance, participation, 
equality and dialogues in their daily recovery processes. In responding 
to the Christianization alleged to the churches providing shelters for 
evacuees by those included in hardliner Muslims, for instance, the 
communities use serawung strategy by allowing moderate Muslim 
leaders to visit the churches one by one and led shalat together, as 
well as conduct a short qur’anic study. This is to cool down the heat-
ed situations, and to prove that Christianization issue during evacu-
ation periods is a non-sense. This strategy is also helpful in enclosing 
Muslims and Christians’ relationship. Upon their returning home, the 
community also tried to embrace the minority Christians in their daily 
collective recovery processes to lessen the social distances. By doing 
so, they have enacted the principles of mutual understanding, equality 
and participation as the basic principles of democracy. 
As such, the practices of raso pareso and inter-ethnic solidarity in 
Padang, West Sumatra and serawung, sengkuyung and gotongroyong in 
Kaliurang, Yogyakarta have shown us the local values that are positive 
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for peace keeping and democratic building. This clarifies us the sense 
that in local areas the roots of democracy is strong, practiced through 
daily activities, and becomes the daily values of life (Mohanty, 2007: 
18). With their attachment and engagement with their fellow neigh-
bors and environment, people are encouraged to build tolerance, mu-
tual understanding and self-control. Collectivity that features their 
social relations has enforced them to be a responsible, yet helpful, 
individual, challenging the skepticism of Huntington (1993) on Asian 
democracy.  
Indeed, this is not to claim that Padang and Kaliurang are the 
perfect example of peacekeeping and democratic strengthening in 
local level. There is still potential friction especially due to religious 
differences and differences in perception about tradition between old 
and young generation that might be influential to the way they handle 
the daily social needs and issues, as well ethnic differences in Padang, 
including those in the phases of emergency and recovery. Equality 
between different ethnic groups that is dichotomized into majority 
and minority, as well as native and new comers, remain a challenge 
in Padang context. Similarly, the community priority on maintaining 
good relationships has created some barriers for being critical in their 
village environment in the case of aid distribution. 
However, the community’s experience in Padang and Kaliurang in 
responding to the potentially fragmenting issue, as well as the social 
hardships post-the disaster recovery through giving and sharing has 
reminded us that there is still potential for building democracy from 
the grassroots level (Isaac and Heller, 2003: 87). The wide spreading 
NGOs in Indonesian regions, as well as the wide use of social media, 
are beneficial to encourage the promotion of democratization through 
the practices of democracy from below. Some successful experience of 
NGOs’ involvement in guiding public participation in policy-making, 
as well of public pressure using social media in particular critical is-
sue in Indonesia, has raised expectations of the possible widening of 
democratization agenda using daily cultural practices and democracy 
from below experience as a seed. This raises our optimism, amidst 
the big pessimism towards the development (procedural and formal) 
democracy, in countries like Indonesia, which is hijacked by few elite 
through the operation of political oligarchy (Von Luebke, 2011: 2). 
This clarifies us that Indonesia could develop their democracy through 
their own roots and traditions, in addition to their political learning 
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The utilization of cultural practices have in fact helped the community to 
build and maintain good social relations, especially in post-disaster context, 
that the community is able to conduct peace keeping, which is useful to 
hasten recovery processes. Further, those cultural practices are also very 
healthy for the development of local democracy, which is important in 
community’s disaster governance. Based on the experiences of the two 
communities in the above-mentioned areas in post-disaster contexts, this 
report highlights that democracy which is practiced from below every day, 
is an important seed for the development of democracy in general context. 
It could be an alternate route for the official democratization, which is 
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